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Chapter 1 - Introduction  
Since piracy has increased dramatically in the past four years, the global maritime response 
has responded in force.1 However, problems in both International Law and strategic 
framework in which these states operate have hampered the ability to deter pirates from 
attacking the lucrative shipping traffic in the gulf. From the basic tactical requirements such 
as Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) through to the prosecution of pirates, all aspects 
of counter-piracy warfare is affected by International Law.2 If the International Laws on 
piracy are vague this will reflect in the naval deployments seeking to combat pirates. The 
lack  of cohesive and coherent international and domestic laws has unnecessarily restricted 
the way military forces can act. This strategic ‘shackling’ is one of the more amendable 
shortcomings in dealing with piracy that can be resolved, given sufficient identification and 
policy recommendations. 
This paper will make explicit the causal relationship between the legal shortcomings in 
addressing piracy in the Gulf of Aden (GOA hereafter) and the strategic effects that has. 
Certainly the problem and any potentially-permanent solution of piracy are not strictly 
bound by the above confines. The underdevelopment of Somalia serves to provide a 
perpetual source of pirates who will eagerly replace those captured or killed in the GOA. The 
inability of Somalia to govern itself and secure its own ocean territory must factor into any 
long-term policies aimed at curbing piracy.3 Add to this a wealth of transnational issues in 
the GOA including the political climate surrounding Somalia as a whole and the general lack 
of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) capability in addressing the basic peacekeeping 
needs of Somalia, and the problems facing both counter-piracy strategy and regional 
security become myriad . By providing a descriptive account of piracy in the GOA in strategic 
and legal terms, the possible avenues of improvement in both can be isolated and examined 
fully. 
                                                              
1 International Maritime Organisation.”Piracy Off Somalia” http://www.imo.org/home.asp?topic_id=1178 
Briefing 48, November 2005. 
2 Boot, M. “Pirates, Terrorism and Failed States”, Council on Foreign Relations. December, 2008. 
3 Lennox, Patrick “Canada’s Presence in the Arc of Instability” Diplomat and International 
Canada (November/December 2008), 15. 
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Nonetheless, protecting civilian shipping in the GOA is a priority given the importance 
thereof. Thus evaluating the strategic capability of the naval deployments, both Task Force 
and national, in the context of current International Laws on Piracy is of value regardless of 
the broader issues surrounding Somalia and the GOA as a whole. Improving intelligence 
networks in the GOA can break the current strategic paralysis experienced in the GOA, as 
well as circumventing any confusion generated by International Law. 
1.1 Aim and Rationale 
Given the fluid nature of the ongoing problems in the GOA, this paper aims to highlight the 
current legal and strategic difficulties faced by the piracy repression forces in the Gulf. By 
illustrating the international and institutional legal vacuum and the resultant strategic 
handicapping, one might better understand the need for overarching coherency in counter-
piracy operations in the GOA. This research paper will be to provide a strong analysis of the 
causal relationship between international maritime law with specific regard to the GOA’s 
context and the strategic schools of thought currently being employed by the navies 
operating there.  
The purpose is to provide  a contribution to the  literature the hampering of counter-piracy 
strategic thought due to legal constraints and vacuums. Further investigation into either 
aspect might draw on this work in the future.  
1.2 Literature Review 
The recent rise of piracy in the GOA is unprecedented in modern naval circumstances, but 
does bear resemblan ce to other instances of piracy which have occurred both historically 
and recently. This paper analyses three major periods of piratical activity, all of which 
explain in some aspect the nature of piracy in the GOA. 
Firstly, this foundation will begin with early accounts of counter-piracy operations, from the 
scourge of the Uskok and Barbary pirates in 16th and 17th century Venetian seas to the more 
formalised English piracy which brought Venetian merchant shipping to a virtual halt. 4 The 
contexts of early piracy are well-documented in popular media and highlight the basic 
objectives of the pirates, such as the focal economic ends rather than political, together 
with the difficulties in combating them. One crucial author therein is Captain A. Mahan’s 
                                                              
4 Tenenti, A. “Piracy & The Decline of Venice 1580-1615”. Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd, London. 1967. 
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conceptualisation of naval strategy in the 16th-18th century, detailing the pivotal point at 
which naval strategy becomes naval tactics, and the appropriate uses against piracy. 5 While 
the traditional nature of Mahan’s pre-steam-powered naval age is not perfectly compatible 
with modern approaches, there do exist, within reasonable bounds, various crucial 
overlapping concepts which carry through to modern naval strategy. 
The modern definition of piracy must be clearly identified. This entails providing a solid 
conceptualisation of modern 20th and 21st Century piracy involving the Straits of Malacca 
precedents as well as the broader, ‘war on terror’ implications for counter-piracy 
operations.6 One prominent author in this regard is Martin van Creveld’s remarkable 
reconceptualisation of warfare as it related in both the 20th and 21st century provides a solid 
preparatory explanation of the importance of adapting naval power for emerging “low 
intensity warfare.”7 This is of particular relevance given van Creveld’s explanation of the 
challenges facing modern state naval power in fighting a perceived enemy who may employ 
tactics and weapons which violate virtually all laws on war under the broader aegis of “Low-
Intensity Conflict” (LIC).8 LIC essentially poses a new challenge for conventional military 
forces, both on land and at sea. In the complete overmatch situation which small pirate 
skiffs with lightly armed crew still manage to create problems for large warships festooned 
with an array of weaponry epitomizes the challenges of LIC.9 
Finally, modern strategy in addressing similar problems of counter-piracy, particularly the 
JTF assembled by the US Navy and South East Asian counterparts in combating pirates in the 
Straits of Malacca bears some relevance  in the GOA context.10 The lessons of Malacca are 
certainly relevant to the current conceptualisation of modern piracy, but the GOA presents 
a basket of new issues which challenge this. The importance of thus defining piracy in this 
specific context and illustrating the historically-unique example it establishes is made clear. 
                                                              
5 Mahan, A. T. “The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783”, Little Brown, and Company, Boston. 
1928. 
6 Garamore, J. “Piracy in Straits Highlights Need for Maritime Security. American Forces Press Service. June 
2005 
7 Van Creveld, M.  “The Transformation of War”, The Free Press, New York. 1991. Pp204-205. 
8 Loc. Cit. P18-19. 
9 “The Most dangerous seas in the world”. Economist Print Edition. Jul 17th 2008 
10 Garamone, J. “Piracy in Straits Highlights Need for Maritime Security”, American Forces Press Service, June 
2005. 
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Strategic problems of piracy in the GOA possess unique characteristi cs which are not easily 
explained through similar contexts, and this paper aims to create some of the first literature 
on this field. Put simply, the situation in the GOA has the potential to make a unique 
contribution to strategic thought on piracy. Nevertheless, this paper draw s heavily on the 
substantial literature available on the GOA problem through two primary channels, namely 
the Council of Foreign Relations and the International Maritime Bureau.11 Both produce 
informative and valuable literature, the value of which increased by the paucity of 
widespread literature specifically-relating to the strategic and legal problems facing counter-
piracy in the GOA. 
Since 2005 piracy has experienced a surge in attacks within the GOA. With 12% of the 
world’s petroleum products being shipped through the Gulf the strategic importance of 
maritime security in this area is self-evident.12 The immense shipping activity through the 
GOA in general, with 20,000 vessels transiting the GOA each year highlights this importance 
beyond the domestic threats to legitimate fishing vessels from littoral states in the Gulf.13 
The impact of piracy is far-reaching, from containerised cargo to fishing. Piracy in the GOA 
had risen to prominence largely due to the International Maritime Organisation’s (IMO) 
request to the United Nations to act against the increasing attacks on shipping in the area by 
pirates operating out of Somalia.14 With the creation of “Combined Task Force 151” (CTF 
151), the international response to this rise in piracy has become far more robust in its force 
composition and mandate.15  
Given that CTF 151’s predecessor, CTF 150, comprised of many states’ naval vessels which 
had neither the capability nor the mandate to actively mount counter-piracy operations the 
new task force has contributed more effectively to suppressing piracy in the region.16 But 
eliminating the scourge of piracy in the 21st century is beset by numerous obstacles. The 
                                                              
11 International Maritime Bureau Website. www.imb.org 
12 National Security Council. “Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan ,” December 
2008, 4,  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/0812_nsc_counter-piracy-action-plan.pdf. 
13 Lennox, P. Op. Cit.  
14 “Piracy in waters off the coast of Somalia,” International Maritime Organization , November 2005, 
http://www.imo.org/home.asp?topic_id=1178. 
15 Commander, Combined Maritime Forces Public Affairs, “New Counter-Piracy Task Force Established,” U.S. 
Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. Fifth Fleet, Combined Maritime Forces , January 2009, 
http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2009/001.html. 
16 Lennox, P. Op Cit. 
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nature of piracy has changed significantly since the heydays of the 16 th and 17th century 
Barbary pirates, and the strategic requirements have shifted as well.17 It is thus important to 
investigate whether or not the world’s navies are adapting to the current strategic context 
in this ocean space. While the primarily-economic objectives of piracy remain remarkably 
similar to that of their historical counterparts, gone are the days where legitimate navies 
and states are able to apply brutal counter-piracy tactics and bring justice to bear.18 The 
strategic and legal context of counter-piracy challenges in the GOA has created a unique 
scenario in the 21st century wherein the historical legal and strategic approaches no longer 
provide any feasible solution. 
But International Law remains a contentious subject in of itself. The question of whether 
International Law is in actuality law was addressed in somewhat extensive detail by John 
Dugard. According to Dugard, International Law can indeed constitute ‘law’ in the 
conventional understanding regardless of whether sufficient capacity for punishment or 
enforcement exists because firstly, “Few serious jurists insist on effective sanctions as a 
requirement for the existence of international law."19 Secondly, Dugard cites Sir Frederick 
Pollock who argues that a legal legitimacy merely requires a surrounding political 
community and the recognitions by these members of the binding rules placed upon 
them.20 Although in modern international law a ‘political community’ is by no means in 
consensus on International Laws, particularly amongst developing nations. Thus consensus 
by majority has largely taken precedence over outright consensus. While this is due to the 
broadening of what the global community comprises of post-reformation and the creation 
of the United Nations, it raises questions over just how legitimate International Law could 
be if there is no global consensus.21  
For the scope of International Laws on Piracy, however, it is justifiable in most courts to 
invoke current International Laws due to the generally ‘despicable’ nature of the crime. 
Moreover, enforcement of International Laws on Piracy, while a major problem tactically 
                                                              
17 Boot, M. “Pirates, Then and Now,” Council on Foreign Relations. July/August 2009. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65156/max-boot/pirates-then-and-now 
18 Tenenti, A. Op. Cit.  
19 Higgins, R, “Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use It.” 1994. Pp13-16. 
20 Dugard, J. “International Law, a South African Perspective.” Second Impression, 2nd edition. Landsdowne: 
Juta. 2001. P08. 
21 Ibid. P14. 
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and politically-speaking, they are at least feasible to some degree, which removes any major 
doubt over the legitimacy of International Laws of the Sea. 
International Law has originated in no small part from the Law of the Sea. Indeed, the first 
recorded International Crime was that of Piracy.22 With the Reformation arose the need for 
an International Law amongst European states, with its precepts laid out by St Thomas 
Aquinas.23 But the Law of Sea was originally codified by Grotius for the purposes of the 
Dutch East India Company in order to secure open and free shipping rights.24 Therein lies a 
part of the problem in International Law on Piracy. It is historically codified as a specific act 
in a specific context over a specific part of the seas (high seas) throughout several major 
Laws on the Sea, elaborated in Chapter 3. This historical precedence has so far failed to keep 
pace with the changing nature of maritime boundaries and the evolution of piracy itself. In 
failing to do so, the problem of International Laws governing what to do with pirates with 
regards to engaging them and when on trial have become unclear or, at the very least, 
unhelpful.  
Maritime security has evolved considerably since the days of the Dutch East India Company, 
and up until the mid 20th Century International Laws on Piracy kept pace. However, in the 
21st Century there is a lot of room for contention on these original authors’ notions of what 
the International Laws of the Sea should be, with Piracy in the GOA (and Malacca) serving as 
a strong advocate for change. Piracy laws represent one aspect of International Law which 
appears to have progressed comparatively slowly to its terrestrial counterpart (conventional 
laws on war). 
International Law by definition places piracy only on the high seas, and not in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) of a littoral state (full definition on page 39) .25 This cannot be a feasible 
definition of piracy  for the context of the GOA given that the sheer number of piracy-related 
incidents in the region can in no small part be attributed to Somalia. Somalia, as the world’s 
worst failed state, does not have  government institutions, such as a coast guard  and 
                                                              
22 Rubin, AP. “The Law of Piracy” EPIL. 2nd Ed. 1999. 
23 Dugard, J. Op Cit. P11. 
24 Ibid. P280. 
25 P.K. Mukherjee, “Editorial,” Journal of International Maritime Law  September 2004. P301. 
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judiciary, to combat and prosecute pirates off its coast, it is unreasonable to define the 
scourge of piracy in the GOA as anything but the menace it is.26  
Nonetheless it is important to note that the rise in piracy in this strategically-vital area has 
not been matched by similar agility from International Law. The insistence that eleven 
pirates captured by US forces in March 2006 be tried in Kenya instead of in the United 
States under an archaic 18th century law  is testament to the unpreparedness of legal 
systems in dealing with this unique manifestation of a traditionally ancient crime.27 The 
International Laws that determ ine just when, where and how pirates are defined, captured 
and tried is ineffective in the GOA.28 Combined with the truly multinational makeup of 
virtually every civilian vessel transiting the gulf, from flag, port of origin and crew, navigating 
the legal waters can understandably have a trying effect on commanders attempting to 
actually mount counter-piracy operations.29 
Unfortunately this lag contributes towards the strategic shackling of the various coalition 
task forces mounting counter-piracy operations in this region, in the sense that Somali 
pirates resemble honest fishermen, as they pilot vessels captured from fishermen.30 This 
then compounds the problem of identifying and interdicting piracy attacks in an efficient 
manner. At present, state warships are predominantly limited to the mere escort and 
protection of friendly vessels, as opposed to seeking out the pirates offensively or mounting 
strikes against the friendly ports and pirate havens. Identifying and tackling the problem of 
piracy on a military level is not only tactically complex, but the high rate of releases on the 
rare occasions when pirates are positively identified and apprehended cripple what few 
offensive counter-piracy operations are carried out.31 Without the prosecution of captured 
pirates, nor the active seeking out of their home ports and vessels, the military response to 
                                                              
26 Somalia: Countering Terrorism in a Failed State , Africa Report (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group). 
27 Stephens, B, “Opinion: Why Don't We Hang Pirates Anymore?” wsj.com , November 25, 2008, sec. Global 
View, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122757123487054681.html?mod=loomia&loomia_si=t0:a16:g12:r2:c0.57794
8:b19711063. 
28 Harwood, M. “Pirates Frustrate US Navy in the GOA,” Security Management. Nov 2008.  
http://www.securitymanagement.com/news/pirates-frustrate-u-s-navy-gulf-aden-004865 
29 Hanson, S, “Combating Maritime Piracy,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 2009, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/18376/combating_maritime_piracy.html 
30 IMB, Pictures of suspected pirate mother vessels, 13 August 2008. http://www.icc-
ccs.org/main/piracy_al.php?newsid=20, accessed 21 August 2008. 
31 Deheza, E,  The Danger of Somali Piracy, Biuletyn Opinie (Amicus Europae Foundation, 2009), 
http://www.kwasniewskialeksander.pl/attachments/BIULETYN_OPINIE_The_Danger_of_Somali_Piracy.pdf.  
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piracy in the GOA only partially addresse s the initial deterrence of pirates. The strategic 
response to the post-2005 surge in piracy, then, has been greatly influenced by 
International law. 
By analysing the historical roots of piracy, as well as the approaches towards eliminating it 
the unique context of the GOA, however different, can be crystallised effectively. 
Furthermore, by examining the strategic approaches to counter piracy from the Uskoks to 
the Somalis in the light of International Laws surrounding piracy (some of which have 
remained unchanged over centuries), there is the potential for understanding just how 
these counter-piracy operations might be improved conceptually and operationally. With 
correct multilateral cooperation combined with a clear, coherent interpretation of 
Internation al Law, containing the surge of piracy in the GOA is certainly within reach. 
Contemporary movies often depict a highly-romanticised version of piracy and pirates, 
portraying them as dashing swashbucklers. Indeed the infamous pirate Captain Henry 
Morgan who raided and sacked Panama has been immortalised through a popular brand of 
rum in modern times.32 In reality the scourge of piracy is a recurring and cyclical problem for 
legitimate sailors both civilian and military, and stemming the rise in attacks has traditionally 
been just as difficult.33 Between the Barbary pirates of old and their 21st century 
counterparts, ranging from the Straits of Malacca, Gulf of Guinea (GOG), Niger Delta and 
GOA, the tactics and methods by which piracy is committed have changed, but several 
commonalities do arise. The rise of piracy, particularly in the GOA, has embodied in part 
what Martin van Creveld has termed “Low-Intensity Conflict” (LIC).34 LIC’s generally manifest 
in a noticeably lower ‘tempo’ in terms of the impact of the conflict itself. Unlike 
conventional warfare, LIC’s represent people fighting over individual or group interests 
rather than state-on-state objectives.35 This then implies that the resolution of an LIC 
requires an entirely different strategy, often utilising conventional military forces as a 
peripheral tool, rather than a primary one.36 Alternatively, Mary Kaldor argues for a 
conceptualisation of LIC’s not as a new form of conflict different from ‘war’, but rather a 
                                                              
32 Esquemeling,  J, The Buccaneers of America (New York: Dover, 1967). 
33 Watts, W. “Supertanker’s hijacking underlines pirate threat,” Marketwatch. Nov 2008. 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/supertankers-hijacking-highlights-piracy-threat-in-somalia  
34 van Creveld, M. "The Transformation of War" (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
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different manifestation of the same set of principles.37 This means that piracy is, in the 
framework of ‘new wars’, simply a set of belligerents pursuing specific strategic and political 
objectives – much like a state – and inflicting similar consequences upon the landscape in 
the process.38 However, piracy in the GOA has a characteristically economic motive in that 
well-organised syndicates wage piratical attacks against civilian ships for monetary gain 
rather than for any political motivation, as argued in the subsequent chapters. Moreover, 
there is the justification that Somali piracy emerged as a direct re sult of illegal fishing in the 
Gulf, depriving legitimate Somalis of the livelihoods.39  
While there is a school of thought on GOA piracy which claims that the hard-line Islamist 
organisation Al-Shabaab has a hand in piracy, this is convincingly refuted by a distinct lack of 
evidence, even though it is believed that the organisation receives funds from pirates.40 
Piracy  and counter-piracy represent a new conflict environment, and thus pose challenges 
for strategic and legal approaches thereof, but the apolitical motives of piracy in the GOA 
effectively preclude it from being classified as a “new war”. 
The violence perpetrated off the coast of Somalia and Yemen no longer resembles the 
historical showdowns between state militaries for political objectives. Indeed, Clausewitzian 
interpretations of the purpose of armed conflict cannot apply to the GOA, where Somalis 
wage piracy against multi-flagged, multi-national -crewed shipping out of sheer economic 
desperation. Ultimately, piracy  in general has changed significantly from its historical roots, 
but still resemble a strategic threat to shipping in the 21st century, regardless of the plethora 
of military technology at the hands of legitimate state navies to counter it. The nature of 
piracy is such that even a minor presence in a critical shipping lane such as the GOA can 
prove disastrous in terms of global economic and human security. 
While piracy has been a problem for almost as long as man has been sailing the ocean, the 
16th and 17th century piracy which raged through the Mediterranean, Adriatic and Aegean 
                                                              
37 Schouten, P. “Theory Talk #30: Mary Kaldor on Framing War, the Military- 
Industrial Complex, and Human Security”, Theory Talks . 2009. http://www.theorytalks. 
org/2009/05/theory-talk-30.html Pp04-05. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. 4th Chatham House Update and Stakeholder Consultation 
Meeting – Report, Chatham House, April 2008. 
40 ‘Pirates fire rockets at French boat far off Somalia’, Reuters, 14 September 2008. 
http://africa.reuters.com/wire/news/usnLE339233.html. 
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seas still provides a clear precedent as to the risk and complications surrounding the fight 
against pirates due to the extensive and preserved literature surrounding the period, as well 
as the scale of the problem.41 Although dating even as far back as the Viking long-boat raids 
as far away as the shores of America, the piracy emerging from the Mediterranean and 
Caribbean from the 16th century onwards provides a far better sequential conceptualisation 
of piracy when contrasted with its 21st century resurgence.42  
Operating in small galleys powered by sail and oar, pirates from a variety of nationalities 
wrought constant havoc upon merchant shipping moving to and from the then powerful 
Venetian Republic.43 Ranging from the Slavic-origin Uskoks to the more malevolent English 
interests, Venetian shipping suffered immensely as piracy continued uncontrolled by any 
naval presence deployed.44 While the former’s motivations tended to be economic and 
religious, the English were following orders from the political leadership, wherefrom the 
economic benefits provided added incentive.45 These pirates traditionally sought to capture 
the crew and cargo of a chosen target, occasionally keeping the vessel itself, whereupon 
ransom could be negotiated for the release of the crew and/or ship or the hostages pressed 
into slavery.46 The pirates relied chiefly on their numbers and speed to overwhelm their 
target before they managed to reach a safe haven or friendly military galley, resorting to 
murdero us reprisals should their victims resist boarding.47 Indeed, it is important to note 
that the objectives of the Barbary pirates, as well as most non-state privateers operating in 
the Mediterranean, were largely commercial , namely the capture of as much valuable cargo 
and crew as possible. With the exception of the English and Dutch vessels that were 
operating in the Mediterranean for political and strategic reasons just as much as for sheer 
commercial gain, the scourge of piracy remained largely beneath the realm of state on state 
warfare.48  
                                                              
41 Tenenti, A. Op. Cit. i -ii. 
42 Archer, C, “Review: [untitled],” The Americas  51, no. 3 Jan 1995: 438. 
43 Tenenti, A. Op. Cit. 154. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. Pp 154-155. 
46 Korin, A &  Luft, G, “Terrorism Goes to Sea,” Foreign Affairs, December 2004, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/7545/terrorism_goes_to_sea.html. 
47 Tenenti, A. Op. Cit. 22-24. 
48 Ibid. 
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It was in the waters of the Caribbean and Pacific in the  17th and early 18th centuries where 
piracy began to ‘evolve’ into several forms, a number of which  still exist in 21st century case 
studies. In a review by Marcus Rediker, three primary types of piracy existed: officially 
sanctioned piracy, commercial piracy, and marauding.49 Furthermore, he argues that these 
forms of piracy formed a sequence in which  each stage fed into the other: 
“these types of piracy existed in a general (though over-lapping) chronological sequence, with 
officially-sanctioned piracy dominant between roughly 1570 and 1670, followed by commercial piracy 
between 1660 and 1700 and anarchistic marauding between 1690 and 1730.” 50 
Given that a similar  pattern of the nature of piracy can be said to have occurred in the 
Mediterranean as in the Caribbean, it follows that piracy historically follows a path of 
evolution; that of semi -legitimated or justified acts of piracy in defence of state or 
sovereignty, then into a quasi-accepted form of violent commerce in poorly-governed 
provinces, and lastly into all-out anarchic marauding, whereupon piracy is waged purely for 
profit with barely any political motivation whatsoever. 
The first, officially sanctioned piracy is best typified by the privateers operating both in the 
Caribbean and elsewhere : English and allied vessels hired by the crown to raid Spanish 
territories and vessels on the seas.51 In this regard, piracy can manifest into a truly crippling 
threat to a state’s economic well-being, particularly during the colonial era. Indeed, during 
the decline of Venice due to rampant piracy, the emergence of English-crewed and English-
sponsored vessels contributed almost beyond the scourge of the Uskok or Barbary pirates 
towards the downfall of Venetian shipping.52 In the 21st century, this first type of state-
sponsored piracy has ceased to exist as a major threat and, given the international nature of 
global shipping lanes and commerce, it is unlikely to arise as a major threat to maritime 
security in the foreseeable future considering the expense and skillsets required to 
effectively crew even one warship to wage large-scale state -on-state piracy. It is worthy of 
noting, however, how the state intervention into a practice by people whom Cicero aptly 
termed hostes humanis generis, enemies of the human race, essentially legitimised a far 
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more targeted - yet by no means less detrimental – form of maritime piracy against state 
enemies, rather than sheer targets of commercial opportunity.53 Nonetheless, threats to 
contemporary shipping no longer fear this state -level piracy so much as far less controlled 
forms thereof. 
The second form of piracy, that of commercial profiteering off the ‘spoils’ of the pirates 
themselves, presented immense benefit to citizens in the affected region who dwelled on 
the “periphery of the empire”, as a means of gaining currency by conducting business with 
the pirates themselves.54 This form of piracy can be argued to have persisted into the 21st  
century, but manifested in a slightly different manner, particularly within Somalia (see 
Chapter 3) . The semi-autonomous area of Puntland exists in a similar function, at least 
economically, as the citizens of these fringe colonial provinces of old: purely as a territory 
for pirates to spend and enjoy the fruits of their criminal activities. 
Finally, the final stage of piracy in the Caribbean was that of “marauding”.55 This final form 
of piracy can be further divided into two categories, that of “organised marauding”, where a 
home port is adopted, and “organised marauders”, where no home port is generally used. 
Both are the popularly known ‘brands’ of piracy  glamorised in books and movies by the 
buccaneers who generally have little or no political affiliation, but rather seek fame and 
fortune through sea robbery. The former category of “organised marauding” is typified by 
the Barbary pirates and Caribbean counterparts who took to well -defended, permanent 
ports of origin, from which their attacks were launched.56 The infamous Captain Kidd was 
largely a pirate of this type once his political backers revoked his status as privateer, thereby 
classifying him squarely as a pirate, rather than a hunter thereof.57 “Organised marauders” 
consisted largely of free-roaming pirates with no permanent home port or origi n, instead 
living largely at sea and epitomising the notion of ‘anarchy’ at sea. Of chief importance is the 
scourge of “organised marauding” in the sense that this is largely the form of piracy which 
manifests in the GOA and elsewhere in the 21st century. Without overt state support and 
precious few coastal provinces or cities willing to accommodate pirates on a long-term 
                                                              
53 Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan. Op. Cit. 
54 Rediker, “Review,” 354. 
55 Ibid, 354-355. 
56 Rediker, M. Op. Cit. P 354. 
57  Rediker, M. Op. Cit. Pp 352-354. 
19 
 
basis, the rise of remote, inaccessible ‘pirate ports’ in -unstable regions is the broad context 
of modern piracy. 
Piracy in the GOA today is thus quite different from its historical roots in the Mediterranean 
and Caribbean. When one examines the small, fast speedboats and limited small-arms 
employed by contemporary pirates, it seems a far cry from the heavily-armed light galleys of 
the Barbary pirates or the sloops of their Caribbean counterparts.58 Pirates of the 21st  
century operating in the GOG, Straits of Malacca and GOA, amongst other regions, generally 
use small speedboats with min imal numbers armed with an array of light weapons, ranging 
from knives, pistols and AK-47s to Rocket-Propelled Grenades and similar weaponry, quickly 
and effectively overwhelming their victims.59 While there are adaptations of this strategy by 
pirates, particularly in the GOA, it is certainly indicative of general practice by modern 
pirates.60 In the 21st century, military vessels create complete force overmatch, which 
means that pirates effectively have little choice but to operate unconventionally, lest their 
skiffs be blown out of the water by grey-painted warships many times their size. 
Furthermore, this contemporary form enables pirates not only the ability to effectively 
elude traditional forms of detection and identification for the simple reason that they 
resemble the civilian fishing and transport boats operating in these areas. 
Much like the “organised marauding” nature of piracy in centuries past, modern pirates in 
the Straits of Malacca, GOG and GOA all rely on local compliance in providing friendly ports 
where  they are able to hide from barely-functioning coast guards or, if a foreign naval task 
force should be present, blend in with the local population.61 This modern day return 
“organised marauding” raises a host of complications in any counter-piracy strategy which 
might be adopted. In addition, counter-piracy strategies which may have worked in the 
Malaccan Straits would not necessarily be effective in the GOA. The narrow corridor of 
ocean space which the former consists of means that a concerted joint effort by South East 
Asian littoral states was effective, whereas the GOA is a comparatively vast area to patrol, 
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surrounded by littoral states who are neither capable of counter-piracy operations nor 
functioning fully as governments to begin rudimentary steps towards that aim.62 
Historically-speaking, piracy has been countered  with large-scale military engagement both 
on land and at sea, whereby pirate vessels and havens were destroyed through violent 
means.63 When Captain Kidd and his ilk were no longer deemed useful to the English state, 
which by then had stabilised as a hegemonic power economically and militarily, pirates were 
stamped out by 1726. 64 In this sense the  application of a large military force served to  
eradicate  piracy in the affected regions when sufficient political will and incentive was reach 
by the government affected to act against it.  
In the contemporary Straits of Malacca, the challenges of counter-piracy reflected the 
considerably more complex nature of maritime security in modernity. Given that pirates in 
the Malaccan Straits posed a threat to several different nations, and the difficulty in chasing 
such an elusive enemy as modern pirates in speedboats across several state territories, the 
obstacles towards effectively stamping out piracy was not as simple as the application of 
sheer military force.65 Ultimately, piracy in the Straits of Malacca was effectively countered 
through a host of multilateral joint operations headed by the United States, which included 
training programmes of coast guard and naval services in Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand, and legislation authorising hot pursuit.66 But in the context of the GOA, a 
similar approach has not applied for the reason that the foundations for such broad -based 
strategic cooperation by a number of neighbouring littoral states who possess a coast guard 
and/or naval force is virtually impossible in the GOA , in light of the littoral states involved 
and their poor state of development and naval deficiency. 
Combined with the Horn of Africa’s lack of development in terms of maritime security 
regimes, another factor compounding the capability of anti-piracy vessels and measures in 
the GOA is that of the restrictive human rights and international legal opposition towards 
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taking more aggressive, historically-proven methods of tackling pirates that is strong military 
action: 
“The main reason for this lack of an offensive element in the response is the international human 
rights regime, which makes it difficult for western warships to aggressively stamp out this scourge 
against humanity as they have done in the past. Instead of killing pirates and destroying their hide-
outs and boats and all of their equipment, there is now a necessity to provide them with fair trials, 
even if the international legal architecture necessary to do so does not exist.”67 
The old methods of applying sound counter-piracy strategies do not apply in the  GOA’s 
context. Gone are the days of pirates being enemies of humani generis , perhaps for the 
better. Whether the human rights regime is correct or not in advocating gentler action 
against pirates, heedless of whether the Legal and Policy frameworks exist to implement it, 
is a matter beyond the scope of this paper.  
Within the context of the GOA, however, it need only be observed that navies and legal 
thinkers are faced with tougher problems in dealing with pirates than their historical 
counterparts. To be sure, the human rights regime has allowed for a great deal of change in 
land-based warfare, often informing ROE amongst Western militaries beyond mere strategic 
utility. The recent ban on cluster munitions which recently came into enforcement being a 
prime example.68 However, if one of the goals of the human rights regime is to prevent 
civilian casualties, then the current approach on piracy in the GOA could well serve to 
increase the chances of pirates to kidnap innocent sailors for ransom. 
However, the problem of counter-piracy operations in the GOA is not simplified by the lack 
of military and political agency to chase and kill or capture pirates. With the advent of the 
human rights regime, the problems of dealing with piracy in the 21st century is  compounded 
by the lack of aggressiveness, and the context of international legal lag in reflecting this new 
regime further muddies what was historically a straightforward, if expensive and large-scale, 
strategy for countering piracy. Lastly, the unique context of the GOA’s littoral states ensures 
that, even if a historically-military solution were applied, the actual source of piracy in 
Somalia would not necessarily be defeated. 
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1.3 Analytical Framework  
In order to fully appreciate the complexity of the security issues at hand it is necessary to 
devote some attention to the region of the Gulf, particularly that of Somalia. It is important 
to note that while solving Somalia’s failure as a state is of utmost importance to the overall 
resolution of the incessant conflicts waging both on sea and land in the country, the 
developmental challenges surrounding Somalia are largely beyond the scope of this paper. 
Instead, being able to adequately explain Somalia’s collapse and the overall situation is 
sufficient to place it in the context of 21st century piracy and both the strategic and legal 
obstacles faced by actors in this region. 
The case of piracy in the GOA is examined under a realist framework, as the power 
relationships within the naval powers operating in the area reflect this quite effectively. 
With the lack of effective government and diplomatic ties with Somalia itself, let alone 
Puntland, the realist approach to International Relations could potentially assume centre 
role by default. The realist paradigm does not place emphasis on diplomacy and related 
aspect absent of military force. Martin Wright argues that the power of a state “did the 
talking.”69 Put plainly, the more powerful a nation, the more weight it throws around the 
globe. As one state gains more and more power, be it economically or militarily, so others of 
lesser power must either band together in order to become of equal stature, or fall by the 
wayside and become mere observers. 
Never has this power dynamic been more plainly exhibited than by the naval forces 
deployed in the GOA. With strong naval powers (or even just strong powers) preferring 
unilateral deployment as is the case of rising stars China and India, as well as the USA, who 
do still allow for ‘alliances’ in the sense that it cooperates willingly with the task forces 
assembled by several less-powerful nations. In explaining the naval presence in the GOA, 
one can clearly observe these dynamics in action. 
Furthermore, the current international maritime laws of the sea is scrutinised and the lack 
in addressing this problem and context highlighted. Particularly important is the current 
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United Nations “Law of the Sea” and the problems therein.70 As one of the most recent and 
important components of International Law, this will provide a key insight into the legal 
failings and what the consequences thereof are for strategic capabilities of naval command 
in the GOA. As a major component of this thesis, understanding both the historical and 
contemporary nature of International Laws of the Sea is necessary in order to place them in 
the context of the Indian Ocean. The problems of definitions on what the “high seas” are 
combined with overlapping and contradictory municipal laws abound. Moreover, the failed 
state that is Somalia, replete with a lack of functioning judiciary as Westerners know it, 
results in jurisdiction problems both for the trying of pirates as well as who is responsible for 
captured merchant vessels flying flags from all manner of states. 
The evaluation of actual current operations being mounted in the GOA, ranging from basic 
tactical procedures and capabilities to the broader strategic approaches adopted by several 
national  naval deployments, as well as multilateral JTF (JTF) previously and currently 
operating in the region , are al l necessary. In doing so, one shall be able to gain a far more 
detailed grasp of just what is being done in the sea to curb pirate attacks on civilian 
shipping. This is not strictly limited to purely naval operations as civilian shipping has a 
similar trac k record of countering piracy through their own tactics.71 Understanding the 
context and tactics employed by Somali pirates versus the military responses will aid in 
appreciating the strategic difficulties in building an effective policy response to thwarting 
pirates in this ‘Area of Operations’ (AO). 
Finally, comprehending the task of counter-piracy will aid in exploring potential 
improvements on policy which could aid in several avenues. Firstly, the problem of 
‘deterrence’ measures and how to successfully improve the ability to discourage pirate 
attacks in the first place is discussed. A key part of this is what is termed “Maritime Domain 
Awareness” (MDA), or effectively broadening the overall intelligence picture of the GOA. In 
LIC, information can often be key in improving strategies geared towards resolving or 
minimising the effects of the belligerents (pirates, in this case.) 
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Secondly, taking the fight to the pirates without a hypothetical large -scale intervention in 
Somalia is discussed. The importance of exploring realistic strategies towards countering 
piracy is primary in this paper. While intervention in Somalia as a whole is a worthy of 
extensive study, this paper seeks to provide short to medium-term containment policies 
specifically geared towards fighting pirates at sea and, to a reasonable extent, on land. 
Destruction of motherships is a key component of this, as they play a pivotal role in pirates’ 
ability to extend their range far beyond territorial shores of Puntland and Somalia as a 
whole. 
Lastly, before concluding remarks the potential for improved mechanisms which civilian 
actors can utilise is briefly discussed. However, due to the limited utility of Private Military 
Contractors (PMCs) and the inability of maritime organisations to enforce stricter security 
measures, the constraints for civilian shipping in the GOA remains quite tight. 
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1.4 Evidence Requirements and Collection Plan 
In addition to extensive literature on naval strategy sp anning centuries combined with 
current journal contributions such as the Council on Foreign Relations and direct military-
related material, this thesis has gained valuable insight into the contextual importance of 
the GOA and the problems of piracy repression at sea through a small but useful pool of 
interview subjects. 
Given the current nature of piracy in the Gulf, this is not an entirely unreasonable 
expectation. Major contributors to this paper include a senior fellow from a respected South 
African Inte rnational Affairs think tank and a senior research at the Institute for Security 
Studies, both of whom are outstanding experts in their related fields. This small collection of 
interviews has enabled the thesis to provide an extra layer of insight beyond that garnered 
from text books, journals and contemporary commentary pieces. 
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Chapter 2 – Somalia and the Gulf of Aden  
Somalia has seen a plethora of mediations, negotiations and interventions in the past two 
decades, all aimed at solving the chronic collapse of the world’s most failed state.72 The fall 
of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991 effectively served to end what little semblance of unitary 
government Somalia enjoyed.73 The region essentially “suffered a rupture” in the 
subsequent years so debilitating that it has yet to recover.74 Therefore the rise of piracy in 
2005 and its subsequent escalation into an organised form of “marauding” can be said to 
reflect the economic incentives behind Somali piracy which are ultimately based on land. 
Somalia’s troubles have fluctuated from political to the more recent economic interests 
behind maintaining instability, which thus pose a key obstacle towards any lasting power-
sharing negotiation.75 Somalia’s collapsed state thus ushered in Piracy, as legitimate 
fishermen were deprived of a living and fellow Somalis are driven to desperation in search 
of an income. 
It is understandable in contemporary international relations to consider the failed state of 
Somalia as a lost cause, politically, economically and strategically. 76 With clan-based strife 
ranging from Mogadishu and further south through all of Puntland and parts of Somaliland, 
the recent post-2005 surge of piracy off the coast, and constant political upheaval between 
the internationally-recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and various hard-line 
Islamic groups such as the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) or Al-Shabaab, Somalia is indeed a 
veritable cornucopia of insecurity.77 The intervention of the United Nations into Somalia in 
the early 1990’s being a colossal failure in terms of conflict prevention and resolution, 
precious little effort has been made by the international community other than World Food 
Programme (WFP) shipments being made regularly through the  piracy-affected waters.78 
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There is an atmosphere of hopelessness in thought about Somalia, both in how to secure it 
and in how to conduct any manner of long-term development. By analysing the historical 
progression of Somalia’s politics, clan relations, and the rise of Islamism from the 80’s 
through to the current status quo, one is able to understand not only the mistakes made by 
international mediators and Somali political agents, but likewise gain a deeper insight into 
just why Somalia is perceived in current international relations to be a hopeless case.79  
Somalia’s political context, both historical and contemporary, are essential in understanding 
the emergence of the majority of pirates in the area, along with a particular emphasis on 
the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Furthermore, the broader 
understanding of why Somalia’s mediations have failed in light of the historical precedents 
set at international and local negotiations, military offensives and religious divisions aid in 
understanding the incentives structure and origin of piracy off the coast. Finally, the GOA’s 
importance as a shipping chokepoint for global commerce is detailed below, as well as the 
evolution of tactics by pirates, together with the initial response thereof by international 
governments and civilian shipping organisations.  
The importance of Somalia in terms of the impact piracy has on shipping in the GOA is 
profound. The rise of attacks as well as the increased range in which piracy is occurring has 
created a permanent threat to sailors transiting the region.80 Somalia’s instability from 
Kismayo to Puntland has generated an almost limitless supply of desperate men willing to 
venture out to sea to make what is seen to be easy money, in a region where any cash 
whatsoever is a luxury.81 
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2.1 The Collapse of Somalia 
Somalia’s spiralling crises began with the Somali National Movement’s (SNM) offensive 
against the government and its forces in the north in 1988. 82 With a distinct absence of 
mediation or conflict resolution efforts, the country’s government fell and along with it the 
stabilising presence of the regime’s head, Siad Barre three years later.83 The lawlessness 
manifested thereafter in the form of pillaging, looting of cities and emergence of a famine 
which claimed an estimated 250,000 lives.84 From the outset, the silence of the 
international community in response to the outbreak of widespread violence and human 
displacement characterised the early “wait and see” approach, which has proven over time 
to be one of the key problems towards solving the crises in Somalia. 85 
Following the fall of Barre’s regime in 1991, a struggle of control over the capital Mogadishu 
waged over several years between two rival clan warlords, Ali Mahdi and General Mohamed 
Farah Aidid.86 With this escalation in violence in Mogadishu, the 1991 collapse of 
government in Somalia represented the first of several “missed opportunities” in the sense 
that the United Nation’s unwillingness or inability to pay attention to the warning signs 
within  the failed state, which pointed to the protracted conflict not only within Mogadishu, 
by Aidid and Mahdi, but also throughout Somalia.87  
Should UN intervention have occurred at this critical juncture, it is possible that the 
consequent civil war and instability, including the rise of piracy, could have been avoided or 
at the least minimised.88 The failure to put a swift and decisive cap on the rise of violence 
following Barre’s removal cannot be ignored when considering the years of instability which 
followed due, at least in part, to the inaction of the international community, as it is an 
important precedent from which future planners of Somalia’s post-conflict reconstruction 
can learn from. 
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With Mohammed Aidid  of the Habr Gidr clan and Ali Mohamed Mahdi of the  Abgaal waging 
war on the streets of Mogadishu, and a number of smaller clans who allied themselves with 
one or another patron warlord, the UN Operation in Somalia, or UNOSOM, mission was 
deployed to enforce a Chapter VII mandate against both parties in Mogadishu and 
surrounds, effectively attempting to enforce a ceasefire.89 However, by the time UNOSOM II 
was authorised by the Secretary-General in order to ensure the distribution of food aid and 
disarmament measures through Somalia as a whole, Aidid was refusing to accept 
negotiations, opting instead to continue waging war against political rivals and the UN 
forces in general.90  
UNOSOM has thus been the historical benchmark of failed mediation in Somalia, and a 
‘warning’ of sorts to any intervening state or organisation wishing to mend the crises-ridden 
state.91 But it is important to bear in mind, as argued below, that the intervention was 
flawed in strategic composition as well as in terms of leadership clashes between the UN 
Secretary-General and the United States.92  
What was initially an unknown (albeit UN-sanctioned) attempt at feeding a starving nation 
amidst a civil war, ended in a tremendous outcry from Americans back home at the 
witnessing of such graphic violence against their fellow Americans.93 With the ultimate 
withdrawal of US forces from the region, and the eventual breakdown of the UN 
humanitarian mission, UNOSOM served as not only a warning for future intervening powers, 
but also as an indictment of the top-down, poorly-managed approach by the UN.  
The UN departure from Somalia in 1995 following UNOSOM I & II’s failure was swiftly 
followed by the constant civil war at the hands of several clan warlords vying for their own 
segment of the region.94 The collapse of Siad Barre’s regime at the hands of rebels in 1991 
effectively ignited the beginning of the end of any semblance of stability in Somalia.95 With 
Mohammed Aidid and Ali Mohamed Mahdi waging vicious war on the streets of Mogadishu, 
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not excl uding the scores of smaller clans who allied themselves with one or another patron 
warlord, the UNOSOM I mission was deployed to enforce a Chapter VII mandate against 
both parties in Mogadishu and surrounds, effectively attempting to enforce a ceasefire.96 
However, by the time UNOSOM II was authorised by the secretary-general in order to 
ensure the distribution of food aid and disarmament measures through Somalia, Aidid was 
ultimately responsible for refusing to accept negotiations, preferring instead to continue 
waging war against political rivals and UN forces in general.97  
With an American Ranger and Quick Reaction Force (QRF) operating within Somalia 
independently towards detaining Aidid himself and his staff, the October 3 ‘Blackhawk 
down’ operation created an international scene.98 When the militia forces paraded a 
dismembered American body through the streets of Mogadishu which was quickly televised, 
the message that hit the United States had significant consequences.99 What resulted was a  
tremendous outcry from Americans back home at the witnessing of such graphic violence 
against their countrymen  for no apparent objective or gain. What subsequently resulted 
were the withdrawal of US forces from the region, and the eventual breakdown of the UN 
humanitarian mission.100 In the case of Somalia, not only was the premise for the military 
intervention justified by the United Nations the public support, before Blackhawk Down, 
remained by large unaware.  
Somalia has been ignored as a worthwhile endeavour after this failure precisely because it 
has been perceived as a ‘trouble child’ without military or political solution. With the failure 
of Operation Gothic Serpent, the objective of which was to capture Aidid himself as well as 
the general ineffectiveness of UNOSOM II to ensure peace and stability while distributing 
aid, military intervention has not been seriously considered since with the possible 
exception of CMF 151’s presence in limited counter-piracy operations off the Somali coast 
and the small AMISOM force currently deployed in Mogadishu.101 It is not ridiculous to claim 
that the probability of success of an overall humanitarian intervention, including peace 
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enforcement, conflict resolution, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation DDR, 
humanitarian aid and so on, is minimal at best.  
However, there were several mitigating factors in 1993 which provide a valid counter-
argument to this assumption, such as the actual strategic purpose of intervention in Somalia, 
which mutated significantly over the period in which UN forces were actively involved in the 
country.102 While the Secretary-General had accepted the option endorsed by the Security 
Council in Resolution 94 a major, US-led “enforcement operation” also under American 
command, the initial objectives were almost immediately altered by Boutros-Ghali acting in 
his capacity as Secretary-General, resulting in the above -mentioned confusion of strategic 
purpose.103 What had been stressed by President Bush as a limited, near-term operation 
designed to keep the channels of food aid open and secure, almost immediately was warped 
in concept by the Secretary-General: 
“American forces entered Somalia on December 9. Later that day, however, the secretary-general told a 
delegation from Washington sent to brief the secretariat that he wanted the coalition not only to disarm 
all of the Somali factions, but also to defuse all mines in the country (most mines were in the 
secessionist north), set up a civil administration and begin training civilian police.”104 
This inability to clearly and coherently establish the political goals of the military 
intervention is important when evaluating the probability of success in intervention in 
Somalia. The objectives of the military forces were never coherent outside of the 
Resolution’s papers, and this fed directly into the initial misunderstanding as to the strategic 
purpose of the operation.105 While state leaders are effectively responsible for this lack of 
cooperation, the same phenomena can easily be repeated by institutions in which state 
leaders operate. 
When President Clinton took over from President Bush in 1992, the mission in Somalia 
warped further, ultimately providing one major obstacle towards any tangible success in 
Operation Restore Hope at all.106 With Clinton came the beginnings of “assertive 
multilateralism” and the notion of not just keeping open the channels for food aid, but also 
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of  encouraging the broader ambit of nation -building and development as a whole.107 This 
was not the original intention for UNOSOM forces, nor was it able to respond to the 
mounting violence on the streets of Mogadishu and surrounds.108 Effectively, Clinton’s 
almost ad hoc dabbling with foreign policy shifts manifested into a strategic quagmire in 
Somalia:  
“The administration immediately reached for new options, deciding to double the total American 
military presence in Somalia and offshore, while announcing the intention to withdraw entirely by 
March 31, 1994. ‘Nation building’ had thus become a desperate search for a face-saving American 
withdrawal, exactly one year after Americans would have departed under President Bush's original 
plan.”109 
If the reasonable probability of success for a contemporary intervention is to be seriously 
considered, it is important to take heed of the above mistake committed by the change of 
presidents and foreign policy in the United States. In order to embark on a large-scale 
intervention, especially with the leading state actor cooperating with a UN task force, the 
strategic evaluation of what objectives are attainable with the forces available, as well as a 
clear and coherent timetable, must  be established beforehand.  
UNOSOM typified the problem of “missed opportunities” in the sense that the conception, 
commitment and execution of the mission were all flawed in approach, which resulted in 
ultimate failure. According to Paula Roque of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the 
problem of the UNOSOM intervention rested in some part on the possibility that there had 
not yet been achieved a “maturity of conflict”, in the sense that warlords and their 
associated militias were not yet prepared to negotiate a settlement, nor could they be easily 
coerced into doing so with simple military force.110 Furthermore, during the dialogue 
between Boutros-Ghali, President Bush and subsequently President Clinton, Roque points 
out that there was very little commitment by any of the leading powers towards a long-
term, sustainable effort to stabilise Somalia.111 
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Following UNOSOM, the majority of the subsequent mediations focused on the question of 
whether Somalia could function best, or indeed at all, with a federal or centralised form of 
governance. The Sodere talks in 1996 and 1997 were convened with this in mind, but 
ultimately failed to reach a consensus.112 Likewise, a 1998 effort led by Ethiopia 
incorporated a “building-blocks approach” through which “existing regional governments in 
Somalia (such as Puntland) would federate into a decentralized state.”113 However, clans 
who wielded power in Mogadishu vigorously opposed this, as it was perceived to be of harm 
to their own interests.114 
The ‘interests’ of clan leaders in Somalia raises an important contributing factor to Somalia’s 
chronic instability. Political leaders within the country are historically unwilling to commit to 
any manner of mediation or compliance with other parties if a loss in their own interests, 
largely economic, is believed to be a possibility.115 Federalisation of Somalia could ultimately 
marginalise clan leaders in Mogadishu as their spheres of influence would be restricted by 
negotiated lines rather than territory held through military force.116 Conversely, however, a 
unitary government process faces precisely the same obstacle, as clans have not historically 
proven willing to share power with a coalition, nor are they prepared to maintain a 
federalised system.117 The 2000 Arta Peace Process hosted in Djibouti sought to implement 
a power-sharing, unitary government based on the “4.5 formula”, whereby parliamentary 
seats are allocated proportionally to the four main clans, with half that number being 
attributed to the collective minority groups.118 The process ultimately failed as the plethora 
of clans and factions shifted in terms of power gained and loss, ultimately rendering the 
power-sharing model incapable of maintaining proportionate representation.119 The 
problem of building peace amidst continued clan and religious-based mobility (in the form 
of Al-Shabaab) is thus self-evident. 
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In October 2004, after prolonged negotiations and ceasefire violations, continued external 
pressure bolstered mediation and resulted in the formation of the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG).120 Composed of a narrow clan coalition, the proportionality of the TFG is 
questionable at best. The TFG’s hold on power has remained tenuous since its formation 
despite continued support by AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and 
Desertification (IGADD, now IGAD.)  
The 2006 May offensive by the Council of Islamic courts (CIC) – or Islamic Courts Union (ICU) 
- saw the defeat of rival militia in the capital and outwards, extending throughout South-
central areas.121 The CIC maintained power until Ethiopia ousted the ICU in a December 
2006 offensive.122 This was ironically one of the most peaceful periods in So malia’s recent 
history, despite the radical brand of Sharia law under which it existed:  
“the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a coalition of Sharia courts, united Mogadishu and helped restore peace 
and stability in a lawless and chronically insecure South/Central Somalia, providing this region with its 
first period of relative order and governance since the demise of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991.”123 
Ironically, the CIC managed to effectively eradicate piracy altogether during its six month 
reign of power by attacking the pirate ‘haven’ ports and aggressively rooting out pirates on 
land and sea.124 Indeed, for the brief period in which the CIC maintained control of greater-
Somalia, piracy ceased to be a major issue. This was achieved not because the CIC saw piracy 
as a reprehensible breach of International or even Islamic Law, but rather because the pirate 
warlords were political enemies.125 When the TFG, backed by Ethiopian troops, wrested 
power from the CIC in late 2006, piracy surged once more as the TFG’s control over the 
country lapsed in the south, leaving Puntland once again to the pirates.126 
Eliminating the scourge of piracy in exchange for hardline CIC rule is simply exchanging one 
political and security threat for another. Eliminating the scourge of piracy in exchange for a 
Taliban -esque repressive Muslim theocracy or vice versa is ultimately unsuitable for either in 
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the long-term. Nonetheless, it did highlight the phenomenon that, with a sufficiently-unified 
governing body and sufficiently aggressive military action, piracy can indeed be eradicated. 
The crux of the issue then is a matter of achieving a stable government with sufficient 
military clout to eliminate pirates not because they are political rivals but simply due to their 
burden upon Somalia’s development.  
The final iteration of Somalia’s series of failed mediations and interventions is that of the 
AU-sanctioned African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). 127 Formulated in 2007, AMISOM 
has seen a deployment of 5000 out of a maximum 8000 sanctioned by the organisation. 
When considering that the failed UNOSOM intervention of 1992/1993 comprised of 30000 
troops, this number from the AU is woefully inadequate.128 Furthermore, the lack of any 
meaningful logistical support for these troops spells disaster for any progress towards peace 
which neighbouring states might hope for, as the lack of any firepower beyond small arms 
will not dissuade Somalis from continuing the LIC’s which have plagued the country since the 
fall of Barre’s regime. However, given that a centralised government has not historically 
represented Somalia’s clans, even when based on the 4.5 formula, Somalis will continue to 
perceive any central government or even the process through which it is formed as a zero -
sum game. This makes mediation incredibly complicated, as no single significant clan leader 
or Islamist leader can be marginalised for fear of a prolonged insurgency emerging. 
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2.2 Factors in Somalia’s Continued Collapse 
Somalia stands out amongst the many weak or collapsed governments in Africa as being 
particularly plagued with an inability to bring together even the most basic, cynical form of 
governance. Somalia has been seen then as a “failure among failed states”.129 But the 
collapse of the state can be explained in three aspects as defined below, all of which possess 
potential for solution: Domestic factors, external interests and interferences and the failure 
of diplomacy.130 Domestically, Somalia’s failures in mediation and eruptions in violence can 
be attributed largely to the sheer number of actors involved in the political affairs of the 
country. Moreover, many of Somalia’s in fluential actors have an active interest in stalling the 
peace process.131 While warlords have largely been the typical scapegoat, often fomenting 
violence against rival clans, other spoilers of the mediation process includes that of the 
merchant classes, who profit greatly from the conflict, or even from the ownership of vital 
ports, from Bossasso upwards.132 Furthermore, the businessmen of Somalia are increasingly 
responsible for hiring large security militias to secure and guard assets, often confronting 
rival merchants over makeshift ports and lucrative trading areas.133  
Externally, Somalia has experienced several international spoilers who have an interest in 
maintaining the constant state of war and conflict. Ethiopia, for example, has intervened on 
several occasions to ‘restore stability’ in Somalia, but have often served only to destabilise 
the collapsed state further.134 Their intervention in December 2006 to oust the CIC, whilst 
endorsed by international actors such as the United States, toppled an otherwise 
functioning, if somewhat hard -line, Islamist CIC which had been able to not only maintain 
peace and stability in the south-central areas of Somalia (no small feat by any means) but 
also eradicate pirate attacks in the GOA during their regime. Ethiopia’s interests in Somalia 
extend, it can be argued, only in as much as Ethiopia can minimise the effect which conflict 
in the failed state spills over into Ethiopia itself.  Menkhaus maintains that “(a) lively debate 
exists over whether Ethiopia is willing to support the revival of a Somali state as long as that 
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state exists on its terms.”135 The importance of external spoilers rests more in the 
implications it has for winning the trust of the Somali people. With actors both outside the 
state and within attempting to derail peace processes, Somalis tend to view international 
interference in their affairs negatively. 
Perhaps most importantly, however, the historical pattern of the international community in 
“missed opportunities” best defines most attempts to pacify and stabilise Somalia. The 
immediate aftermath of Siad Barre’s downfall, together with the administrative incoherence 
of UNOSOM serves as early examples of the international community’s failure to capitalise 
on rare opportunity to influence Somalia greatly, together with the United States’ reluctance 
to become involved once again in Somalia. While these states and organisations do take an 
active role in counter-piracy in the GOA from the safety of vast naval vessels, incursions on 
land in Somalia remain minor operations designed either for counter-terrorism roles or food 
aid protection.136Somalia by no means presents a simple solution for mediation, but so have 
mediators also missed key opportunities to effect meaningful change at the critical time, 
resulting in stagnation in terms of Somalia’s political development. 
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2.3 Emergence of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden 
When Menkhaus wrote on Somalia’s failings in 2003, he wondered at the distinct lack of 
evolution in Somalia’s lawlessness, not then aware of the imminent emergence of piracy as 
another manifestation of banditry.137 From 2006 onwards piracy originating directly from 
Somalia has been on the rise.138 When considering the endemic poverty, particularly in 
comparison to the rest of Somalia, in Puntland, the home region of the majority of Somali 
pirates, poverty provides a strong incentive to resort to Piracy. Furthermore, with the rise in 
illegal fishing off Puntland’s coasts, the majority of legitimate Somali fishermen have likewise 
resorted to piracy as a means of income, as their fishing grounds are overwhelmed with 
foreign vessels poaching their harvest on a regular basis.139  
The GOA itself is a major artery in global commerce, transporting roughly 8% of global 
commerce and, as mentioned in the first chapter, 12% of the world’s oil, all transported 
annually in 22,000 vessels.140 Since the rise of piracy, however, shipping has increasingly 
come under attack further and further away from Somalia’s shores. Although ostensibly by 
pirate groups calling themselves the “Somali Coast Guard”, these attacks are aimed not at 
curbing illegal fishing off Somalia’s coasts, but rather at capturing valuable cargo and/or 
crew to hold ransom:  
“Armed groups such as the ‘Somali Marines’ out of Haradarre formed amongst the fishermen at first in 
self defence against the range of technically advanced foreign trawlers pillaging their waters and 
sabotaging their equipment. They engaged these foreign trawlers with rocket propelled grenades and 
assault rifles, and were responded to in kind. In one particularly telling incident, a group of young 
fishermen calling themselves members of the Somali Volunteer National Coast Guard ‘impounded’ three 
Taiwanese trawlers in August 2005, and placed a ransom of US$5000 on the heads of each of the 48 
crew members as a fine for poaching in Somali waters.141” 
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Certainly the pretence of Somalis taking justified retaliatory action against illegal fishing can 
provide a good premise for the emergence of Piracy off the GOA, but the taking of hostages 
for ransom, combined with the evolution of attacks to target super tankers, cargo vessels 
and other non-fishing vessels lay bare the fallacy of Somali piracy as a ‘coast guard’ 
countermeasure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the above graph shows, the rise in piracy in the GOA is clearly more than just a 
retaliation against illegal fishing in Somali waters. Much like the evolution of Somalia’s clan-
based conflict into that of hired militia fighting for merchants for control of lucrative ports 
or cities, so too has the rise in piracy reflected the change from that of a small-scale 
operation into a broader, more formalised manifestation.142 Lawlessness and banditry on 
land in Somalia has flourished into a million -dollar business, and thus piracy in the GOA can 
be argued to be a simple extension of the conflict into more lucrative waters. 
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2.3 Somalia – Hope for the Future? 
Somalia has indeed “suffered a rupture” since the fall of Barre in 1991, and the subsequent 
years of conflict serves as a stark reminder to the series of blunders and inactivity of the 
international community towards preventing this.143 Regardless of the zero-sum 
expectations of a centralised government, be it the TFG, CIC, or even potentially Al-
Shabaab, or the more-rational efforts towards federalised regions, none of these 
mediations have proven successful, largely due to a clear and distinct lack of commitment in 
terms of political or logistical support of peacekeeping missions, but also because of the 
array of ‘spoilers’ within and without Somalia’s borders, who effectively stand to profit from 
Somalia’s failings. 
It is thus no surprise that the international response to the surge in piracy has not been on 
land, but rather purely maritime-focused, with several task forces and uniliateral 
deployments operating in the GOA on counter-piracy missions. While the tactics and 
strategies of both the pirates and the navies involved in their removal shall be discussed 
further on in this paper (Chapter four), it is important to understand fully how chronic 
Somalia’s failure as a state is, and more importantly how this will effectively feed into the 
long-term existance of piracy in the GOA regardless of tactics employed to counter them. 
Indeed, according to Lehr, piracy can never be eradicated by a western armada, and rather 
the global community should look towards developing littoral states’ naval capacities 
around the Horn of Africa.144 But even this is optimistic given the absence of naval powers 
both within Somalia and in neighbouring countries. Indeed, with only South Africa as a 
major naval force on the coast between the GOA and beyond, the prospects of African 
navies eradicating a uniquely African scourge (in this context) is slim. Poverty on land and at 
sea serves to drive Somalis towards banditry again and again on land and on sea in turn, and 
without a determined, sustainable intervention within Somalia’s borders, taking full 
cognisence of previous failures at mediation and conflict resolution, piracy shall never be 
fully eradicated. 
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Chapter 3 – International Maritime Laws and the Rules of Engagement 
International Law plays a significant role in understanding the nature of the response of 
navies in counter-piracy operations within the GOA. The definition of where ocean 
territorial boundaries end and the high seas begin is crucial in determining just what piracy 
is and what constitutes hijacking at sea. The jurisdiction, pursuit, boarding procedures and 
subsequent prosecution of suspected pirates all involve matters of International Law. 
However, one major obstacle towards effective international maritime laws pertaining to 
piracy is the question of law enforcement and whether both the former and latter are 
required for the actual existence of International Law. According to Dugard there is a 
debate, albeit a minor one, over whether International Law can actually exist if there are no 
means of enforcement or sanctions.145 Provided the law itself is recognised by political 
interests affected, is an absence of enforcement acceptable as International Law? Within 
the context of Somalia and its immediate littoral neighbours, the question of maritime 
enforcement plays a very real part in the operational challenges within the GOA as well as 
the relevance of International Law pertaining to piracy. 
In the 21 st century, piracy repression in the GOA is influenced by two major international 
conventions that essentially codify the principles of customary law: the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the IMO’s own Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA).146 But these 
International Laws possess several flaws which in turn severely hamper counter-piracy 
operations, or at the very least the formulation of ROE for the task forces deployed to the 
GOA. For example, a major point of contention is that of the UNCLOS definition of piracy 
existing purely on the high seas, and not within the current 200nm exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) of littoral nations as stated in Article 57. 147 This combined with other glaring problems, 
discussed in this chapter, in international maritime law serve only to obscure the mandates 
of commanders actually operating in the GOA and elsewhere. 
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Laws assisting the capture and prosecution of pirates have existed for centuries, and therein 
lies the problem.148 The laws governing the security of the seas tend to reflect an outdated 
problem which has only recent manifested in the GOA in a different form. International Law 
has thus become a disadvantage to naval planners and political organisations seeking to 
reduce or repress piracy rather than a clear toolset for enforcement because of the 
historical influence of International Law.149 The current surge in piracy in the GOA is of a 
unique nature both in terms of the origin and tactics of the pirates themselves and the 
navies involved in fighting them, and in terms of the inability by littoral states to enforce 
what is legally their own ocean territory. International Law is, even if perfectly 
conceptualised, ineffective if it cannot be enforced by domestic and international 
police/military organisations or legitimate, stable governments.150 
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3.1 United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea 
Ratified by over 159 states, UNCLOS serves as the definitive and primary conceptualisation 
of the lawful suppression of piracy, even if it possesses several flaws when placed in the 
GOA context.151 In this sense, UNCLOS represents the codification of centuries-old 
customary law which has been generally accepted by mariners across the globe. As such, 
UNCLOS is effectively the primary source of maritime laws, particularly with regards to 
piracy. While this convention elaborates on many aspects of maritime law, the most 
pertinent is that of its definition of piracy. According to article 101 of the convention, which 
in turn is derived directly from article 15 of the Geneva Convention of 1948, piracy can be 
defined as: 
(a) Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by 
the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
i . on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on 
board such ship or aircraft; 
ii. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any 
State. 
(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of 
facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;  
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).152 
The two most important points in this definition of piracy is that of the notion of “high seas” 
and the question of jurisdiction. The latter because of Somalia’s status as a collapsed state 
and the complete lack functioning, unified judiciary, police force, coast guard and navy 
which all combine to ensure a lack of capability for maritime enforcement.153 Furthermore, 
that the TFG is by no means the undisputed governing authority in Somalia has the 
consequence of undermining its bargaining power at the Security Council’s desk. And the 
former, that of the notion of “high seas”, is important because of the implications in 
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definition of piratical attacks and the measures taken against the perpetrators are 
significantly affected by this demarcation, as shall be explained further in this section. 
Within the convention, there are three major flaws which can serve to impede both further 
operations in piracy repression as well as in creating future international and domestic 
criminal laws to better serve the problem of piracy in the GOA.154 Firstly, there is the sheer 
lag in the convention’s formulation and implementation which potentially renders it 
automatically redundant in several areas. Secondly, the nature of piracy as a “two-ship” 
problem, ie that piracy requires a belligerent and victim ship at the least, in order for it to 
legally ‘occur’. The two-ship problem, while not necessarily relevant to the GOA at present, 
could certainly pose a challenge in the future evolution of piracy, and which the non-
universal Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) does not completely solve. Lastly, and most 
importantly, there is the problem of the definition of maritime boundaries in the sense that 
the “high seas” exist in such a small ocean space as to make a majority of pirate attacks off 
the GOA not piracy by definition, but rather hijacking at sea, which raises immediate 
problems for warships patrolling both territorial and international waters.155 All of the above 
problems pose major obstacles for an adequate legal conceptualisation of what piracy is, 
where it occurs, and how to counter it. 
Firstly, the formulation and drafting UNCLOS took twelve years to draft and another twelve 
to implement in any meaningful sense, i.e. garner sufficient signatories and ratifications.156 
This is problematic for several reasons: Foremost is the expected difficulty in any future 
revisions or amendments which shall almost certainly be required as maritime boundaries 
and security issues evolve. Having taken some twenty four years already, it is not 
implau sible to claim that attempting to actually amend the convention would require 
substantial effort and delays. When one examines just how piracy in the GOA has 
progressed in the past four years alone, the expectation that a major, binding International 
Law such as UNCLOS could keep up in terms of accommodating the rapidly-changing nature 
of maritime security is optimistic at best. Likewise, the problem with such a delay, as could 
be said of most International Law, is that it effectively draws a “line in the sand” as it were, 
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whereby the law itself becomes a laborious, negotiated document which is rapidly 
overtaken by events beyond the scope of the original paper. UNCLOS ultimately puts a 
modern sheen on a conceptualisation of piracy which is centuries old in the sense that it has 
failed to account for the rapidly-shifting nature of piracy, which is in itself considerably 
changed from historical predecessors, be it in the GOA, Straits of Malacca or GOG. 157 
The second critical problem in the convention is that of the “two-ship” prerequisite, 
meaning that for an act of piracy to occur there must be two vessels involved, aggressor and 
victim.158 This then naturally excludes acts of piracy whereby the attackers are passengers 
on the vessel in question. While the major precedent for this is the 1985 Achilles Lauro 
attack, in which four Palestinian Liberation Front hijacked the ship, the potential this form of 
passenger-based piracy exists in the GOA.159 When considering the number of medium-sized 
fishing vessels, ferries and other local shipping, the chances of a ‘one-ship’ scenario certainly 
exist as a possibility. According to the convention, however, this form of attack is not 
defined as piracy, and thus possesses complications in the procedures for boarding, capture 
and prosecution of pirates/hijackers who were originally on board the vessel. This is 
ironically contrary to classical notions of piracy, as John Gibson highlights in the African 
Security Review: 
“Paradoxically, the archetypal fictional pirate, Long John Silver in the novel Treasure Island , would not 
have committed piracy under the convention, as he was already employed as a cook on the ship that he 
seized; he was in modern parlance a hijacker, but hijacking is not piracy.” 160 
Hijacking does not equate with piracy as the legal approaches for prosecution and 
enforcement differ. Hijacking is essentially a policing issue, whereas piracy is a military 
problem. The SUA has addressed this issue in part, and shall be elaborated on in 3.2, but is 
itself flawed for other reasons which in turn serve to undermine the potency of UNCLOS and 
SUA to provide a comprehensive guide towards countering piracy. 
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The final and most important, problem in UNCLOS lies in its definition of the “high seas.” As 
stated in the convention under Articles 3, 33 and 57, the territorial waters of a littoral state 
comprises of territorial sea (12nm), contiguous zone (24nm) and ‘Exclusive Economic Zone’ 
or EEZ (200nm) as illustrated below:161 
 
Source: The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 
www.nwc.navy.mil/cnws/ild/documents/1-14M_(Jul_2007)_(NWP).pdf. 
The territorial and contiguous boundaries enable littoral states to exercise sovereignty over 
this range of ocean space and prohibit any non-peaceful navigation by foreign vessels.162 
The EEZ extends partial sovereignty for the littoral state insofar as they possess rights to 
protect and secure economic assets within the EEZ, and likewise all interceptions of foreign 
vessels therein must be conducted by the littoral state itself.163 The problem in the GOA 
manifests in the legal context when one considers that the majority of the Gulf falls within 
Somalia’s EEZ, contiguous zone and territorial sea. Chapter V of the convention has enabled 
states to establish their EEZ’s if they so desire and the international community has 
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responded, including Somalia.164 This has naturally diminished what is classified as ‘high 
seas’ around the world, with the result that around 90% of piracy attacks worldwide are 
actually not defined as such according to International Law.165 Perhaps one of the larger 
indictments on the convention’s relevance is the prevalence of material detai ling piracy 
which largely includes acts committed landward of the high seas, particularly in terms of 
statistics and maps charting “pirate” activity. 166 If attacks not qualifying as piracy according 
to International Law are still treated as such, at least on paper, the implication for UNCLOS 
should be for a reconceptualisation thereof, at least in terms of the definition of the 
geographical space in which piracy can occur, lest redundancy and confusion remain. 
UNCLOS is based on centuries of anti-piracy International Law, and the notion that piracy 
should remain an international scourge against humanis generis  has remained resolute.167 
Fouche aptly explains: 
“The right of any state to take action against piracy is considered to be a peremptory norm of 
International Law, but if the right extends to waters landward of the high seas, it becomes an 
impingement on the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the coastal state...  ... Compounding this problem is 
that the majority of acts today, which would have qualified as piracy had they been committed on the 
high seas, occur in waters where only the littoral state can exercise jurisdiction under International 
Law.”168 
Even if piracy occurred under the control of a stable coastal state, the definition under 
UNCLOS of just where piracy occurs raises a serious obstacle towards exercising correct 
jurisdiction and operational approaches to counter-piracy. Compounded upon this is the 
complicated nature of Somalia’s coastline. With zero naval capability, the TFG is left 
incapable of managing the security challenges of securing their EEZ. Moreover, the question 
of jurisdiction has become a matter of great concern, as foreign coalition warships operating 
in the Gulf face significant challenges in terms of where they are able to patrol, what level of 
aggression they may use, and under whose mandate. Therein lies the nut of the problem 
faced by warships operating in the GOA: the failure of International Law to provide clear and 
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useful guidelines on the realistic repression of piracy can only serve to feed into a “better 
safe than sorry” approach by many coalitions and individual warships operating in the area, 
in the sense that warships, barring the more belligerent of national, independent vessels, 
tend to err on the side of caution due to the above legal complications. 
Lastly, this paradoxical definition of piracy under UNCLOS leaves states in a catch-22 
situation in the sense that they are unable to criminalise piracy which exists in their 
territorial waters, given that piracy technically does not exist therein. If the convention is to 
be of optimal use in enabling counter-piracy enforcement, this failure to account for the 21st 
century manifestation of piracy as an event which occurs landward of the high seas must be 
addressed. However, as previously mentioned the sheer time lapse in the convention’s 
formulation cannot occur again in any potential amendment process in the future if the 
changes themselves are to be of any real use in curbing piracy. 
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3.2 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA) 
The SUA convention, introduced in 1988, is essentially designed to account for adequate 
countermeasures against pirates and hijackers, requiring contracting signatories to extradite 
or prosecute alleged offenders.169 According to Article 3 of the convention, unlawful acts of 
piracy/hijacking are defined as the following: 
(a) seizing or exercising control over a ship (hijacking) by force or threat of force or other form of 
intimidation, 
(b) performing an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the 
safe navigation of that ship, 
(c) destroying a ship or causing damage to a ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe 
navigation of that ship, 
(d) placing or causing to place on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is 
likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to 
endanger the safe navigation of that ship, 
(e) destroying or seriously damaging maritime navigational facilities or seriously interfering with their 
operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of a ship, 
(f) communicating information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safe navigation 
of the ship, 
(g) injuring or killing a person in connection with the commission or the attempted commission of any 
of the offences set forth in (a) to (f). 170 
The important distinction between the SUA convention and UNCLOS from the above 
definition is in the concept of piracy as an offense which does not necessarily take place on 
the high seas. Furthermore, SUA removes the “two-ship” problem inherent in UNCLOS. 
However, SUA is fatally flawed for the simple reason that SUA is designed, throughout all of 
the above criteria, to avoid the damage or destruction of the ship affected. This has the 
counterproductive result that, provided pirates do not directly and obviously endanger the 
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ship’s integrity, this International Law does not truly apply. Somali pirates, generally-
speaking, operate a skilled boarding and navigation strategy, where the helmsmen is often 
quite skilled and capable of safely navigating the ship.171 Regardless of the fact that the 
vessel is headed towards a pirate port such as Eyl in Puntland, and a subsequent hostage 
situation, SUA provisions and definitions cannot apply to piracy in the GOA. 
The SUA convention is important primarily because of the precedent it sets in updating 
archaic International Laws on maritime piracy to reflect - at least in some part - the realities 
of geographical marine boundaries and the nature of pirate attacks in the 21st century. 172 
While the SUA convention has yet to gain all twelve ratifications needed to bring it into 
force, the law itself enjoys a large base of signatories and will at the least in time add an 
extra layer of much -needed clarification in international maritime law.173 
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3.3 Maritime Enforcement and the Rules of Engagement (ROE) 
When encountering the problem of piracy from an operational perspective, the Rules of 
Engagement (or ROE) are of utmost importance to ensure lawful pursuit and engagement 
with suspected pirates. Having a clear set of International Laws thus feeds into and 
influences the ROE of most western navies operating in the GOA. According to the US 
Military’s Operational Law Handbook, ROE essentially provides “restraints on a 
commander’s actions, consistent with both domestic and International Law, and may, under 
certain circumstances, impose greater restrictions than those required by the law.”174 In the 
GOA, where a plethora of international actors are operating, both in civilian and military 
capacities, off the coast of a collapsed state with zero coastal enforcement capacity, it is 
quite reasonable for US planners and commanders to adopt a more-restricted version of 
ROE than is perhaps completely nece ssary. The problem arises, however, when this 
restricted ROE directly impedes more effective piracy repression strategies from emerging. 
If International Law was a prime influence upon ROE, clear and modernised, this 
phenomenon in the GOA might not exist at all. Unfortunately this is not the case, and ROE 
has become tainted somewhat in its drawing from the well of UNCLOS. 
Historically-speaking, pirates of old would fly the Jolly Roger and be clearly identifiable as 
belligerents upon the high seas, and the p roblem of what legally constitutes piracy did not 
exist as it does today.175 The exclusion of 90% of piracy attacks through the definition of 
UNCLOS has created a serious problem for planners in formulating just what can and cannot 
be done in terms of engaging suspected pirates when drafting ROE. While the right to self-
defence and interdiction remain, the ability for navies operating in the GOA to conduct 
maritime enforcement effectively is minimalised . 
Maritime enforcement off a coast which has no domestic policing mechanisms is an 
immense challenge, regardless of the overarching International Law restrictions which 
apply. Boarding procedures for example are immensely frustrating affairs in the sense that 
the consequences for boarding an innocent vessel carries with it penalties for the 
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intervening state.176 When placed in the context of the GOA, in which hundreds of 
legitimate fishing vessels identical to a pirate skiff ply the ir trade, boarding procedures, 
while endorsed and encouraged under article 110 of UNCLOS, are practically unfeasible 
except in the strongest of suspicions of pirate activity.177 It then stands to reason that taking 
pre-emptive, offensive action against suspect pirates is virtually unthinkable and has been 
reflected in the current trend of naval operations in the GOA. 
The frustration in counter-piracy operations is self-evident. US vessels are several restricted 
in their ROE as to just what they can and cannot do to fight piracy: 
“the U.S. Navy can only directly engage pirate skiffs during an attack on another ship or in self defense if 
pirates fire on U.S. sailors. Even when the U.S. Navy witnesses a successful attack it can do nothing for 
fear of harming the pirate’s hostages. Because of the concern for hostage casualties, the U.S. Navy even 
stands by as pirates refuel and resupply their captured vessels.”178 
This shackling of capabilities is not limited to the US counter-piracy efforts. During of the 
hijacking event of the MV Saldahna in February, the British Royal Navy vessel HMS 
Northumberland  was prohibited from attempting any manner of hostage rescue:  
“the Royal Navy commander ‘was forced to watch as the Saldanha  with its crew of 22 below deck drifted 
past the bridge windows and on towards the Horn of Africa.’ Fisher observed correctly, ‘The mandate of 
the European Union taskforce – of which the Northumberland is part – is to act as a deterrent and try and 
stop acts of piracy in process or about to take place. It does not have the mandate or capability to retake 
captured ships like the Saldanha.’"179 
This scenario of prohibitive ROE is ironically one of the few aspects of counte r-piracy in the 
GOA which is generally-accepted as standard customary practice. But this is not necessarily 
a permanent state of strategic paralysis. To date, Somali pirates do not traditionally harm 
their hostages and have yet to intentionally execute any captured civilians. This would 
explain to some degree the reluctance of states to literally fire the first salvo against pirates 
who hold hostages. However, given the rapidly-evolving nature of piracy in the region, 
bearing in mind the increasing radicalism of al Shabaab, it is not unreasonable to suppose 
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that pirates and terrorists in the AO will resort to more aggressive tactics. This then could 
necessitate a relaxing of Navy ROE, thereby escalating the entire context to a state which 
might see navies mounting offensive operations, raising casualties but also, and most 
importantly, increasing the strategic utility of sailors and marines in the GOA. Finally, had 
the Northumberland received earlier intelligence indicating the hijacking, it might well have 
moved to intercept the pirates before they became a danger. 
In the few instances where pirates are actually detained, the problem of prosecution again 
compounds one of the final stages of counter-piracy operations. There is currently no 
consensus as to just what is to be done with detainees. On the international level, European 
states are reluctant to deal with pirates in their own courts, while local littoral neighbours to 
Somalia, such as Kenya, which holds agreements with the USA to try pirates, often refuse to 
try suspected pirates when they are returned to a friendly port, often resulting in the pirates 
simply being repatriated back to their homeland.180 American law is also plagued by 
similarly hypocritical legal instructions. For example, the US Law of Naval Operations 
dictates that pirates should be taken to the nearest American port and handed over to 
authorities for prosecution.181 International Law however defines piracy as an international 
crime and pirates should thus be taken to the nearest friendly port for trial, which the US 
Navy has done on several occasions.182 Thus it is quite apparent how outdated domestic 
maritime law is in direct contradiction to that of International Law, and can affect SOP by US 
Navy vessels and personnel. 
Ultimately the absence of a clear understanding of just what a pirate is has obscured the 
ability nations to capture and prosecute suspects. The SUA conceptualisation of piracy 
including  the shrinking high seas and beyond is a promising start, even if it has not yet been 
brought into force, and only comes into effect when the safe ty of the ship itself is 
threatened. ROE is directly influenced by codified customary laws, particularly that of 
UNCLOS and SUA, yet the actual failings of these laws have manifested through all stages of 
maritime enforcement. The right to board suspected vessels and the consequences of errors 
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in an ocean space the size of the GOA, travelled by thousands of international and 
commercial vessels is practically unfeasible, particularly when considering the score or so of 
naval vessels patrolling such a large area.183 State naval forces are thus far more prone 
towards avoiding employing any sort of VBSS operation and focus more on pure deterrence 
measures. Likewise, the question of jurisdiction, precisely where navies are allowed 
operated in the GOA is dangerously obscure in the context of the TFG’s inability to wield 
coastal enforcement itself. Furthermore, the prosecution of piracy is hampered not only by 
UNCLOS’ definition of where piracy occurs and what piracy is but also in conflicting domestic 
laws and a general reluctance to actually deal with the problem in the absence of binding, 
overarching judicial bodies capable of putting pirates on trial. If International Law is not 
reconceptualised in the near future to better reflect the challenges of piracy in the 21st 
century, it stands to reason that the ROE of navies mounting counter-piracy operations will 
err on the side of caution, thereby hampering any remotely effective strategy of containing 
or dissuading piracy. 
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Chapter 4 – Strategic Responses to Piracy in the GOA 
The steep increase in piracy attacks within the GOA has produced a combined counter-
piracy naval presence of over thirty vessels as of June 2009. 184 With navies from Russia, 
China, India, Iran, the United Kingdom and the United States, the response to the GOA 
piracy threat represents one of the largest multinational anti -piracy deployments in recent 
history.185 But while the scale of counter-piracy operations appears impressive on paper, the 
actual operational components present clear problems and frustrations in deterring piracy 
in the AO. Currently, the majority of vessels operating in the GOA adhere to stringent Rules 
of Engagement, sticking to purely defensive tactics and interdiction roles which are designed 
more towards securing the waters of the GOA and deterring attacks rather than actively 
seeking out pirates on an offensive basis, either on land or sea.186  Moreover, having such a 
large naval presence is mitigated by the sheer size of the oce an in which they operate, as 
well as the simple reality that not all of the nations involved in combating piracy 
communicate and cooperate with other vessels or with the task forces. 187 
Given the legal problems already argued in Chapter 3, the resultant hesitation by navies 
over just how to proceed from the current status quo can attributed to the opacity of the 
law. While interdiction escort tactics are effective enough in a limited capacity, the pursuit, 
arrest or attack of pirates and their subsequent prosecution has proven far more 
troublesome. Furthermore, the tactics employed by the pirates, while rudimentary, have 
adapted and expanded to match those of the most sophisticated drug cartels or the Sunni 
Arab Insurgencies in Iraq, in terms of communications networks and operational range.188 
But there exists several examples of both effective and ineffective counter-piracy tactics 
already exhibited within the GOA, which can be examined and their failures or successes 
utilized to provide a better understanding of just how counter-piracy operations can or 
should be conducted. The HMS Northumberland’s frustrating back-and-forth encounter over 
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twenty-four hours with the MV Saldahna both before and after capture, for example, 
exemplifies the paralysis navies experience in pre and post-capture situations of the 
targeted vessel.189 Likewise the Indian Naval vessel Tabar’s engagement of a pirate ‘mother 
ship’ exemplified the hazards of a purely “gung-ho” approach to identifying and engaging 
with suspected pirates, as the vessel contained the Thai crew held hostage beneath the 
decks. 190 
Ultimately counter-piracy operations do not solely rely on military solutions. The responses 
by civilian shipping remains the first, and perhaps most important, deterrent against pirate 
attacks at sea. But the commercial shipping response to piracy has been minimal at best, 
with few shipping companies uniformly securing their vessels and training their crew in 
rudimentary counter-piracy drills.191 The strategic approach to minimizing the threat of 
piracy off the coast of Somalia must draw inspiration from both the military and non-
military potential for improvements in tactics, equipment and training, while still drawing as 
much as possible from International Laws on piracy. With the heavy emphasis on a 
defensive posture within the task forces operating in the GOA, reflecting the extreme 
frustration of those involved in counter-piracy, and the “shoot first” approach of non-
Western navies representing a clear danger of overly-aggressive tactics, formulating a 
strategy for co unter-piracy between the two is paramount. 
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4.1 Strategic Framework 
While many experts on piracy advocate the broader development and intervention into 
Somalia as a sound step forward in combating piracy, there are aspects of the strategic, 
military-based approach which can be improved. These strategic recommendations can be 
loosely-oriented around Raman’s threefold categorization of the counter-piracy objectives 
in the GOA.192 Firstly, the inability of over a score of warships in the GOA to effectively 
secure a 1.1 million mile ocean space must be addressed in order to ensure safe transit of 
civilian shipping. The lack of military assets, civilian precautionary measures and 
technological improvements in domain awareness (such as small-target trackers) mean that 
warships often arrive too late to interdict pirate attacks, and civilian ships themselves are 
unable to correctly employ countermeasures to prevent, deter or evade capture. Secondly, 
pursuing and destroying pirate motherships and their skiffs must be recategorised as a 
priority by states willing and capable of doing so. 
All naval warships patrolling the area enjoy a complete force overmatch compared to the 
lightly-armed pirates, but the political will must back this up in order to begin effectively 
eliminating motherships as a viable tactic for pirates while still reducing the potential for 
civilian casualties. Lastly, taking the fight to the pirate warlords themselves is crucial in 
providing increased disincentive for piracy in the first place. The counter-terror strikes by US 
forces, as well as the French commando raid again Le Ponant’s captors prove that limited, 
precision strikes against pirates can work. However, the large number of hostages still in 
custody around Puntland’s ports must be taken into full consideration. 
Regardless, these three aspects of counter-piracy all possess potential for strategic 
improvement, even within the current opaque legal context. Long-term grandiose plans for 
Somalia’s political and economic development are undoubtedly crucial in finding a 
permanent solution to piracy off the Somali coast, but adapting the current military strategy 
on the seas can go a long way towards curbing piracy and its effects. 
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4.2 Military Responses to Piracy in the GOA 
There are four broad categories of counter-piracy deployments in the GOA, arranged loosely 
on national or strategic lines. The European Union’s Naval Force (EUNAVFOR), the UN-
sanctioned Combined Maritime Force 150/151, the plethora of independent warships such 
as those of China, India, Republic of Korea and Iran, and finally the US Navy’s own peripheral 
initiatives operating in a broader, counter-terrorism capacity, under the command of Africa 
Command (AFRICOM).193 While each nation or task force certainly regards counter-piracy as 
a priority, their strategic approaches often differ. 
EUNAVFOR, consisting of several European nationalities including British, Spanish, French 
and Germans vessels, acting within “Operation Atalanta”, was formed specifically to deter 
pirates from operating in the GOA.194 More importantly, EUNAVFOR places the protection of 
WFP vessels as a primary objective therein, aiming to ensure that what aid does flow into 
Mogadishu is not captured by pirates.195 By the end of November 2009, EUNAVFOR vessels 
have successfully guarded almost 300 000 tons of food aid to Somalia.196 Although valuable 
in ensuring that WFP aid safely reaches the shores of Somalia, EUNAVFOR’s track record in 
actually preventing piracy is downplayed in official European Union Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) documentation, which prefers to highlight the impressive statistics in food aid 
delivery.197 When considering the proportionally low chance of a successful pirate attack, 
even in the GOA, the inability of naval forces to comprehensively deter piracy is often 
underemphasized in favour of peripheral successes.198 With around 40 vessels out of the 
roughly 16 000 transiting the gulf annually being successfully hijacked, attempting to find 
the ‘needle’ responsible for the attack, in the giant ‘haystack’ that is the GOA, heavily-fished 
with identical civilian fishing skiffs, is a daunting task.199 The protection of food aid 
shipments is certainly important for EUNAVFOR, but while there have been successful cases 
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of interdiction and the arrest of pirates, the tactics employed by captains have proven to 
place far more emphasis on deterrence rather than direct engagement with suspects.200 The 
arrest of nine suspect pirates almost 200nm off the coast of the Seychelles in April 2009, for 
example, required extensive communication between a French EUNAVFOR maritime patrol 
craft as well as a nearby Indian warship.201 Furthermore, the suspects were eventually 
released due to insufficient evidence.202 
EU NAVFOR could be better employed in direct piracy interdiction roles if a smaller force 
would take up WFP escort duties and the political will existed to scale up the aggression 
levels of European vessels. While the latter can always pose a major obstacle to taking more 
direct action against pirates, the former responsibilities could be taken up by a continental 
organization, such as the South African Navy (SAN) acting under an AU mandate. Indeed, the 
WFP did indeed request the SAN to contribute towards counter-piracy escort duties, but 
was duly decline as the cost of such a deployment would have had to be shouldered by 
South Africa rather than the United Nations.203  According to Capt. Van Rooyen (Ret.), the 
South African Navy has the capability to tackle pirates, particularly in as defensive a posture 
as escort duty, which in turn may well free up EU vessels to provide a far more proactive 
presence in counter-piracy operations.204 However, if the entire cost of such a deployment 
is shouldered by the SAN, even of a single frigate, the length of any such escort mission 
would potentially be limited to several short months. Naturally the benefit of this 
hypothetical SAN deployment could only ever be considered if the states providing vessels 
for non-aggressive escort duties would be willing to shift to the more offensive role of 
pirate-hunting in the GOA as a whole. 
One of the foremost counter-piracy task forces in the GOA is that of the Combined Task 
Force 151. While the Task Force strength and command rotates regularly, CTF 151 
represents one of the more cohesive multinational approaches to fighting piracy in the GOA. 
CTF 151 is Operating under a United Nations mandate according to Security Council 
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Resolution 1846, which effectively endorses navies in the area to take “all necessary means” 
to deter piracy and capture or eliminate pirate-related equipment within the boundaries of 
International Law. 205 206 With the backing, and current command, of the US Navy’s 5th Fleet, 
CTF 151 is responsible for patrolling a 1.1 million square mile ocean space and ultimately 
represents the primary force against piracy in the GOA.207 CTF 151 is the effective extension 
of its predecessor, CTF 150, in an effort to enable those states willing to take more active 
action against pirates to do so without the operational confusion of a mixed mandate under 
a single task force.208 A US Armed Services press release confirmed this: 
"Some navies in our coalition did not have the authority to conduct counter-piracy missions," and thus 
“"The establishment of [Combined Task Force] 151 will allow those nations to operate under the 
auspices of CTF 150, while allowing other nations to join CTF 151 to support our goa l of deterring, 
disrupting and eventually bringing to justice the maritime criminals involved in piracy events." 
It is important to note that states contributing towards CTF 151 have expressed a clear 
willingness to take part in not just ‘security operations’ within CTF 150 (which does not 
therefore place an emphasis on other objectives) but in a counter-piracy framework. This 
willingness can be translated into more effective counter-piracy strategy if given sufficient 
improvements, such as the ability to actively hunt pirates in territorial waters on a more 
offensive posture, free from the binding, defensive nature of simple escort and interdiction 
operations. 
At present, CTF 151 has enjoyed -high success rates in apprehending pirates, however it is 
again constrained from the visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) techniques in making 
contact with suspected pirates, as the costs incurred if a suspected pirate vessel is 
discovered and deemed innocent are high, both in re-compensation to the vessel in 
question and in the lengthy, time consuming procedures required to board another vessel, 
which then enables the destruction of evidence by the pirates themselves. Secondly, the 
broader ROE with regards to when intervention/interdiction can be pursued, as shall be 
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elaborated on further in the HMS Northumberland example, as it highlights the frustration 
in current ROE employed by British warships, which are indicative of the fleet at large. 
Lastly, the problem of evidentiary requirements in prosecuting pirates and in finding a port 
and jurisdiction willing and capable of placing suspects on trial bears mention.209 
Of particular note are the many independent naval vessels from the international 
community operating in the area. With nations such as Russia, India, Korea and elsewhere 
all present in the GOA, piracy repression in the GOA incorporates a plethora of naval powers 
which would not ordinarily share the same ocean space in a common strategic effort. China, 
for example, has deployed two destroyers and a supply ship to the GOA in its first major 
deployment since 1949. 210 The presence of strategic rivals often results in peripheral effects, 
such as the above deployment sparking renewed Japanese interest in sailing the GOA as 
well in an effort to gain diplomatic credit as “doing its bit” along with other global naval 
partners.211  
Moreover, this non-Western naval presence has been involved in unprecedented levels of 
aggressive counter-piracy action, such as the aforementioned Indian vessel, the Tabar, 
destroying a suspected pirate mother ship despite the consequent discovery of the original 
Thai crew still on board.212 Likewise, the presence of Chinese Navy in the GOA could be 
construed more as a precautionary measure to protect Chinese -flagged vessels transiting 
the Somali coast.213 Given that illegal Chinese poaching of Somalia’s tuna stocks is one of 
the original explanations given by the “Somali Coast Guard” for the rise in piracy this greater 
effort at counter-piracy deployment from the East is ironic.214 
One major problem with non-coalition warships operating in the GOA is their reluctance to 
get involved when vessels not of the flag-state’s nationality are at risk, as well as the 
problem of adapting to the ROE requirements which hinder naval vessels:  
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“The laudable naval respons e has been crippled by the apparent inability of naval contingents to quickly 
adapt to international rules and to overcome (self) imposed obstructions; the tendency of navies to 
depart when their own interests or citizens are no longer under threat and maritime transgressors not 
being significantly deterred the naval show of force.”215 
The contribution of independent vessels from Asia and elsewhere is certainly useful in 
increasing the patrolled or guarded ocean area, but when pirates are not deterred by the 
immediate threat or presence of these grey-hulled warships, often very little is done by 
commanders to interdict pirates when not directly in accordance with their ROE. 216 
Negotiating with these states to second vessels into CTF 151, for example, would provide an 
immense benefit in creating a watertight counter-piracy net. 
Nonetheless, actions by independent vessels, particularly that of the Indian Navy, have 
proven to be effective in applying sheer destructive force against pirates. If the Tabar’s 
lessons could be applied on a basis where civilian hostages can be identified prior to 
engagement, it would serve as a good step forward in taking the fight to the pirates 
themselves, in the sense that it would increase deterrents beyond simple policing actions 
and lower the incentives of piracy by making civilian ships much harder to seize. 
Overlapping these deployments to some degree is that of the USA’s Combined Task Force – 
Horn of Africa, which includes CTF150 and 151, but extends into more counter-terrorism-
oriented operations as well.217 While overt military action against Somali militants on land 
has yet to occur beyond small interventions, the United States does mount limited 
operations therein. On September 14, 2009, US forces launched a strike against suspected 
Al-Qaeda operatives in Barawe, south of Mogadishu.218 Operation Celestial Balance showed 
the effectiveness of limited precision strikes, in this case AH-6 ‘little bird’ helicopters armed 
with rockets, and more importantly highlighted how US forces in the GOA are not 
concerned with just counter-piracy as a strategic objective.219  
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Such interventions threaten the authority of the TFG as American forces raid Somali 
territory under the principle of ‘hot pursuit’ (detailed in Article 51 of the UN Charter), and 
further threaten AMISOM peacekeepers who must cope with the retaliation long after the 
AH-6’s have left Somalia for their home vessels. Indeed, retaliation for the strike led to a 
massive suicide attack against an AMISOM base in Mogadishu, killing a score of personnel, 
as well as the deputy commander of the AMISOM mission.220 The importance of this rapid 
retaliation is the lesson it teaches any potential literature on counter-piracy strategy. Given 
the strength of arms of pirate havens in Puntland, intervening on land would require a 
significant feat of arms by coalition naval forces, and retaliations on land and sea would be 
likely. 
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4.3 Tactical Approaches 
Somali pirates use basic small arms and rudimentary equipment in the process of seizing a 
targeted vessel, but the broader tactical and strategic process whereby pirates in the GOA 
go about capturing a victim is far from basic. 221 Likewise, the methods employed both by 
military assets in the area and civilian organizations have changed rapidly since the rise in 
piracy four years ago. 
4.3.1 Organisation 
Somali pirates in their current form operate under broad ‘syndicates’, enjoying the 
patronage of one of Puntland’s major pirate warlords.222 For example, one major warlord, 
‘General’ Garaad Mohamud Mohamed is believed to have hijacked two South Korean 
fishing vessels in 2007. 223 Likewise, the ranges which pirates can operate indicate more than 
just disorganized brigands roaming the sea in small skiffs. With attacks occurring hundreds 
of nautical miles offshore, the communication, equipment and tactics have to originate 
from a network of contacts and procurers, something which Somalia’s warlords are certainly 
adept at managing.224 The Strategic blanket under which the pirates operate extends even 
to the highest levels of government. According to Roger Middleton, President Abdullahi 
Yusuf, whose home region is Puntland, likely receives a payment from pirates as a “gesture 
of goodwill”.225 Thus while not directly sponsoring piracy in the GOA, one can infer that 
government officials benefit in some part from the pirate syndications. Pirates in the GOA 
thus operate from large syndicates with relative impunity on land, their only major threat 
coming from a counter-piracy flotilla which is largely defensive in posture. 
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4.3.2 Tactics 
Somali pirates have developed tactics along what Onuoha calls a “horizontal and vertical” 
basis.226 Horizontally in the sense that the weaponry and equipment used has developed 
immensely since piracy began its rise in 2005, and vertically in that the targeted victims 
which pirates pursue has expanded to incorporate virtually every kind of civilian shipping in 
the GOA.227 
Pirates roam in groups of small but fast wooden skiffs powered by large outboard motors, 
from which they quickly outpace slow, cumbersome containers, oil tankers and the like. 
Once in range, pirates generally attempt to board the target vessel as quickly as possible, 
often firing shots as a clear warning of their hostile intent.228 Once boarded, the captured 
vessel normally begins transiting back to the safety of Puntland’s territorial waters where 
many military vessels cannot enter in pursuit due to their prohibitive mandates.229 But both 
before and after the successful capture of a vessel, pirates employ an array of tactics to 
ensure a swift and profitable operation. The use of ‘motherships’, larger fishing ships 
captured earlier to tow the skiffs hundreds of miles out to sea in order to increase operating 
ranges has become the SOP for most pirates.230 The tracking of ships via Global Positioning 
Satellite systems and through early communications with contacts in Yemen and elsewhere 
further expand the eyes and ears of Somali pirates in their search for an easy capture whilst 
avoiding hostile warships patrolling the gulf.231 The use of motherships has proven 
extremely effective in enabling bolder pirate attacks further out to sea. Furthermore, by 
docking into ports in Yemen and elsewhere, they are further able to elude capture or 
destruction by naval forces as they are never effectively tracked back to Somali ports.232  
Following the successful hijacking of a vessel, pirates quickly identify and open up the 
channels of communication with the ship’s owner or company, whereupon negotiations 
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ensue.233 Typically ransoms average around $1 million, but in the case of the Faina and 
Sirius Star payments over $3 million were made, the latter being delivered via parachute 
onto the deck.234 
It is important to thus note how Somali piracy has evolved into a -sophisticated form both 
tactically and strategically, ‘horizontally’ and ‘vertically’. When the navies operating in the 
GOA inevitably shift their own strategies from lessons learned during deployments, the 
probability of Somali pirates doing is quite high. This has implications in both legal and 
strategic circles, as drafting or revising piracy legislation will inevitably lag behind the reality 
on the water, as well as the importance for naval commanders to maintain a constant ability 
to shift their own enforcement procedures to reflect the challenges they face. 
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4.4 Successe s 
The difficult task of dealing with pirates who adapt rapidly to security challenges and act in a 
murky legal environment is not entirely without hope. There have been several cases where 
military vessels in the GOA have taken comparatively offensive measures against pirates to 
rescue hostages and apprehend the perpetrators. The Maersk Alabama  intervention 
highlighted how highly-skilled military tactics can provide a positive outcome not only in 
deterring pirates, but also in safely rescuing hostages after the hijacking has occurred.235 
Likewise, the less-risky action of French commandos against pirates and pirate -collaborators 
who hijacked the French yacht Le Ponant showed how limited intervention on land can still 
serve to reduce the incentives for pirates.236 
4.4.1 The Maersk Alabama  
The cargo ship Maersk Alabama was seized approximately 240nm off the Somali coast, 
highlighting again the ability of pirates to hijack ships far from territorial waters.237 Crew 
members had successfully overpowered several of the pirates and regained control of the 
ship, but the captain of the Alabama  had remained in pirate hands on board one of the 
ship’s life boats.238 At this point the SOP for most military vessels in the GOA is to back away 
and continue negotiation for the hostage’s release. However, US Special Forces snipers 
aboard the USS Bainbridge successfully killed the pirates and rescued Captain Philips, 
bringing a positive end to the hostage situation.239  
The Alabama case is important as it proves that taking hostile action, when the correct 
military assets with the right skillsets, in this case Special Forces snipers, are present and 
available can prove far more effective than a defensive posture followed by post-hijacking 
ransom negotiation. Such aggressive measures to rescue just one hostage should by no 
means be interpreted as an endorsement of this as tactical SOP, however, as hostage 
situations, particularly on open water, can prove tricky. If there had been several crew 
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members present on the life boat, the probability of success without casualties would 
decrease significantly as the number of civilians can understandably raise the chances of 
innocent casualties. This was precisely the case in the French commando rescue of captured 
mariners aboard the yacht Tanit, in which one hostage and two pirates were killed in the 
ensuing firefight. That being said, a chance of hostages being killed is a risk which 
commanders should be aware of at all times. 
4.4.2 Le Ponant 
Another type of offensive action which can yield beneficial results is that of post-hostage 
intervention. When the crew members of the French luxury yacht Le Ponant  were released 
following the payment of a ransom, commandos aboard several helicopters were able to 
disable the pirates on land, arrest many of those responsible, and recovery a sizeable 
portion of the ransom money.240 Again, the operation required highly skilled military forces 
to successfully capture just six of twelve suspected pirates in total, in this instance a sniper 
aboard a French Puma helicopter shot out the engine of the pirates’ vehicle.241 
The Ponant incident proves that militarily-capable states with the right assets in the area 
can not only recover ranso m from pirates after it has been paid, but also successfully 
apprehend or neutralize them on land. Moreover, this is a capability which can theoretically 
be shared by counter-piracy forces in the area, and not an essential component of every 
single naval d eployment to the GOA. However, the ability of pirates to adapt quickly to new 
tactics in counter-piracy could suggest that hostages in future may be held for a period after 
ransom is paid to avoid this kind of incident.242 
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4.5 Failures 
Failing to kill or capture pirates, whether they possess hostages or not, only serves to 
incentivize the act of piracy itself. As pirates gain confidence in their ability to hijack ships, 
collect ransoms and get away with it, the entire problem of eradicating piracy becomes 
more difficult. The inability of the British warship HMS Northumberland to successfully 
interdict in the hijacking of the MV Saldanha and the ransom of the Saudi super tanker Sirius 
Star provide clear precedents of the dangers of doing nothing to curb piracy when it is being 
perpetrated. 
When the Saldanha was seized, the Northumberland was unable to stop the pirates, and 
had no choice but to observe the hijacked vessel from a distance.243 When the pirates 
instructed the Northumberland to keep its distance, there was effectively little to be 
achieved in terms of hostage rescue or negotiation. According to the Navy’s account, there 
was zero capability for mounting a rescue operation: “With no distress call heard, and with 
the pirates in control and the crew’s life at risk, there was little we could do other than 
speak to the ship’s master and confirm his unfortunate position.”244 
In the above case, the Northumberland was operating as a part of the ATALANTA Task Force, 
yet could achieve little more than act as a deterrent in its immediate range.245 The lack of 
skilled military forces on board, as well as the political will towards granting any kind of 
hostage rescue meant that the Northumberland was only capable of communicating 
information on the situation to headquarters, rather than taking an active approach against 
the pirates post-hijacking. This is important to note, as the actual counter-piracy capability 
of individual vessels in the GOA will vary according to their ability and operational ROE. If 
the Northumberland was trailing the Alabama instead of an American vessel with a Special 
Forces compliment, it is entirely possible that Captain Philips would have remained in pirate  
custody as a hostage. This means that military vessels in the GOA must be evaluated on an 
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individual basis by task force commanders as to just what their tactical capabilities are in 
enforcing sound count-piracy strategy. 
According to Raman, there are three components necessary for a sound counter-piracy 
strategy: protection of civilian vessels such as tankers and freighters transiting the gulf, 
identifying and neutralizing the pirate motherships which serve as the range-extending ‘hub’ 
of immediate pirate activity, and finally the pursuit and destruction of pirate havens within 
Somali territory.246 Almost every state with military assets in the GOA can complete the first 
two requirements, and the USA, with perhaps the French and British military respectively 
can theoretically carry out the third. However, as the strategic reality of piracy repression 
has shown, protecting civilian vessels effectively in an ocean space of 1.1 million square 
miles with little more than a score of naval vessels is understandably difficult to execute. 
Furthermore, the Tabar’s precedent highlights how destroying motherships – assuming they 
can be found – can result in unnecessary civilian casualties. Likewise, the potential to strike 
on land has only been employed on rare occasions, albeit with relative success. 
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4.6 Non-State Responses to Piracy 
4.6.1 Civilian Shipping 
Addressing the problems of piracy is also going to require the victims of piracy to revise 
approaches towards self-defence when transiting through the GOA. What has occurred has 
been the continuous improvisation of measures designed to counter attacking pirates. 
Methods of deterrence include means of physically repelling pirates through electrified 
fencing, the use of fire hoses and Magnetic Acoustic Devices (commonly referred to as 
‘sonic cannons’) which all serve to defeat the ability of pirates to scale the freeboards of 
ships.247 Likewise, the practice of ‘Operational Security’ in terms of strict communications 
discipline between shipping traffic can help prevent Somali radiomen from listening in on 
the locations and heading of any civilian ships in transit through the GOA.248 While these  
tactics are certainly not foolproof, nor are they a long-term solution, they can at least serve 
to delay pirates sufficiently that a nearby coalition warship might respond to their distress 
calls in time to prevent a boarding. 
The costs of re-routing shipping from the GOA around the longer route of the Cape of Good 
Hope poses a challenge to the global economy due to the obvious increases in shipping 
costs, which means that the GOA is an absolutely crucial corridor for international shipping 
transiting from East to West and vice versa. 249 Shipping companies and their affiliated 
organisations such as the IMB have an important role in advising ships transiting through 
the GOA of the dangers in the journey, together with potential self-defence measures which 
captains might employ. Likewise, the peripheral benefits of organisations such as the IMB in 
terms of data-gathering of ships attacked, attacks repelled, what measures were successful 
and what were overcome with little difficulty are of utmost importance in adapting as 
rapidly as possible to piracy as it evolves. 
4.6.2 Private Security and Private Military Contractors 
Private Military Contractors (PMCs) and Private Security Contractors (PSCs) can have a 
pivotal role to play in providing protection services for shipping in the GOA. While unable to 
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actively hunt pirates and carry out offensive operations due to the potential violation of a 
basket of International Laws and arms embargoes against Somali, contractors can ensure 
that shipping companies with sufficient interest in protecting their valuable cargoes, and the 
finances to hire them, can transit the GOA in relative safety.250 Contractors are able to offer 
a range of services, from simple security watch to 183 foot civilian ship modified to provide 
effective protection services for any shipping companies transiting the GOA like US PMC 
Xe/Blackwater offers in their portfolio,.251 Utilising such a range of services would certainly 
provide a far surer means of protection against pirate attacks in the GOA, but has several 
limitations. 
Firstly, the problem of capacity means that no matter how tactically-effective a PMC vessel 
or PSC detail on board a ship might be, there are almost certainly insufficient numbers to 
provide adequate protection for all interested shipping companies, let alone those who 
could afford the expensive contracted services. Secondly, in ternational maritime laws as 
well as that of human rights law would effectively restrict PMCs and PSCs from possessing a 
free mandate against pirates and could restrict their operations as much, if not more, than 
ROE does for formal naval forces.252 
Private contractors thus provide an attractive service and can certainly prevent pirate 
attacks for individual ships, but will ultimately never be capable of replacing state navies in 
the GOA in terms of capability, mobility and sheer force strength. However, utilising these 
services could likely become attractive to states themselves, potentially enabling PMCs and 
PSCs to contract directly with governments, thereby protecting ships based on nationality 
rather than commercial shipping companies’ preference. The caveat of this approach 
however lies in the simple consequence that some civilian traffic which cannot afford a 
contractor and does not belong to a state which is contracting on their behalf would suffer 
from the decrease in formal state military interventions in the GOA. Lastly, the highly-
convoluted composition of most civilian ships would make nationality-based approaches 
flawed from the outset. A Maltese ship owned by a German company, crewed by Thai 
sailors and captained by a Russian would pose an  entirely new set of problems as to just 
                                                              
250 Middleton, R. Op. Cit. 11. 
251 Seper, J. “Blackwater joins the fight against sea piracy”, The Washington Times, December 4, 2008. 
252 Ibid. 
73 
 
who is responsible for protecting the cargo and crew. Nonetheless, arming civilian ships has 
proven successful in its own right.253 Indeed, the Maersk Alabama was again attacked by 
pirates in November 2009, but the attack was successfully repulsed by armed guards.254 
While potentially creating incentive for escalation during pirate hijack attempts, as 
Middleton warns, it cannot be denied that employing private security on board ships with a 
reasonably high risk of pirate attack is effective.255 
Finally, the legal complications of employing armed guards on a civilian ship are noteworthy, 
as incentivising this practice would contravene International Laws on war considerably. The 
Geneva Convention is quite clear on the requirements of combatants in an engagement to 
distinguish themselves from non-combatants, and the same applies on the oce ans.256 
Employing PMC’s in this fashion is highly illegal, even if it does occasionally yield positive 
results, as in the case of the second attack against the Maersk Alabama. Any utility which 
PMC’s acting outside of any national or coalition counter-piracy strategy must be carefully 
considered in the broader context of the illegality of doing so. Blackwater’s own vessel is 
comparatively improved over embedding armed guards on a civilian ship, but the capability 
for individuals to fight pirates for profit runs dangerously close  to the practices of privateers 
of old, which ultimately resulted in a complete lack of order at sea. If even a fraction of this 
chaos were to emerge in the GOA, the economic and human rights consequences could be 
catastrophic.  
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Chapter 5  – Conclusions 
It has become evident in the past four years of counter-piracy operations that there is room 
for strategic improvements. Moreover, the link between International Law and the 
enforcement or strategic manifestation thereafter is certainly crucial in the context of GOA 
piracy. As already highlighted, International Law is a slow, time -consuming process which 
cannot by necessity be so uniquely-customised in composition to suit the GOA’s legislative 
and enforcement needs exactly.257 As such it is far more pragmatic to advocate for strategic 
revisions of counter piracy approaches in all aspects, from defensive deterrence operations 
to offensive strikes on land, as International Law is cumbersome and slow to change, 
thereby proving to be far harder to reconceptualise and operationalise. Ending piracy in the 
GOA permanently will almost certainly require a broader intervention on land to address 
the systemic failure of Somalia.258 But in the ocean space of the GOA, there are aspects of 
piracy enforcement which can be improved whilst not violating current International Law. 
The three categories or levels of piracy enforcement as mentioned in chapter four can all be 
improved to not only increase the effectiveness of deterrence measures but also in the 
destruction of pirate mother ships and skiffs without resorting to risky VBSS tactics which 
often yield no results. Finally, in the actual problem of the pirate ports themselves, there  
exists some room for improvement in addressing the literal root of the problem without 
overly threatening violation of law or risk to the warships and crew. Furthermore, exploring 
new strategic approaches towards dealing with pirate ports in Puntland must be addressed. 
Lastly, civilian measures can be ratcheted up to ensure a heightened sense of awareness 
and security when countering boarding by pirates. Ultimately the current approaches by 
state navies have not only erred on the side of caution in light of International Law, but 
erred too far to the defensive. International Laws on piracy unnecessarily obfuscate piracy 
repression, but current approaches by navies and civilians alike do possess significant room 
for improvement despite this. 
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5.1 Improving the Military Approach 
Piracy in the 21st century is largely considered ‘beneath’ navies, in the sense that it is largely 
treated as a police/criminal action more than a military one.259 However, as Captain van 
Rooyen (Ret.) of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) highlights, navies 
are largely providing a token effort to “still the critics”, meaning that many of the states 
involved in piracy repression operations often do not put a full amount of tactical and 
strategic attention to it.260 Because counter-piracy is a coast guard problem, legally-
speaking, navies involved in the GOA generally do not treat it seriously, even though navies 
do possess a coast guard capability by necessity.261 Finally, the military approach can be 
approved in all sectors through the addressing of the “Maritime Domain Awareness” (MDA), 
in that communications between warships, positions of fleets and vessels as well as the 
ability to confidently identify and track individual vessels leaving the coast of Somalia. 262 
Thus information, just like conventional warfare, is key. 
5.1.1 Deterrence Measures for Shipping Protection 
 Improving th e doctrines employed by warships providing even the most rudimentary 
deterrence -level support in counter-piracy operations would go a long way to increasing the 
force-projection of the deployments of large, expensive vessels. This can be achieved by 
encouraging greater inter-navy communications, which would in turn allow for better 
situational awareness as to just which vessel is where. If CTF 151 vessels were to 
communicate with their EUNAVFOR equivalents to establish clearly separate areas of patrol, 
it would streamline the range and effective of deterrence procedures. Indeed, while limited 
communications procedures are standard for NATO vessels, this practice could in theory be 
extended to the number of individual vessels. If language and tactical differe nces can be 
overcome, the GOA could be patrolled through overlapping areas of operation by each 
warship which, although predominantly defensive in posture, would maximise their 
deterrence effect. Indeed, even if a Chinese warship, which generally only protects Chinese 
shipping offensively, was communicating to EUNAVFOR and CTF 150/151 vessels, it would 
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be theoretically almost as effective a deterrent in non-offensive posture than its respective 
Western vessels.263 Thus there is no sense in having two warships of the same effective 
posture operating in the same ocean range.  
Van Rooyen points out that military organisations tend not to share any pertinent 
intelligence beyond their own active units, meaning that a lo t of useful intelligence on pirate 
positions, practices and events is missed by other task forces and warships in the area.264 If a 
specific ‘high command’ comprised of all nationalities with a naval presence in the GOA 
could be formulated, it would both preserve tactical secrecy of various navies whilst still 
ensuring that vital information on GOA pirate activity can reach the most relevant warships 
and commanders in the area concerned. Moreover, states which may not have a naval 
presence in the area, yet still have some intelligence utility to add can easily append into a 
high command. States with orbiting satellites, aircraft, target-trackers or UAV assets 
operating in the area can provide valuable eyes on the ocean which other militaries might 
not possess.  
Furthermore, this form of military intelligence is neither hostile nor particularly 
controversial in use, which means that states who lack the political will to take the fight to 
the pirates on an offensive scale can still be seen to be ‘doing something’, except in a truly 
useful fashion for all. International Law is typically quite unhelpful in classifying when a 
pirate event is, by definition, a pirate event, and the legalities of pursuit, but providing 
better linkages in the intelligence -gathering process would circumvent problems of 
International Law entirely, as it would merely augment the deterrence measures before 
piracy occurs. In this sense, the establishment of a multinational high command is feasible, 
useful and relatively easy to establish. Given the current joint operations command 
frameworks employed by AFRICOM and CMF, creating an extra ‘layer’ purely aimed towards 
greater strategic collaboration is not completely unthinkable.265 
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5.1.2 Offensive Measures 
Fighting mother ships with  large, sophisticated warships is not tactically difficult, but 
identifying a legitimate pirate ship from a fishing vessel is. With increased intelligence 
measures, the ability to actively intercept and arrest or destroy pirate vessels becomes far 
more accurate and effective. Instead of employing VBSS on suspected vessels, greater MDA 
enables navies capable of taking offensive action to do so with greater confidence. The 
Tabar’s attack on a mother ship, for example, could well have been better executed if the 
hostage’s presence could be verified beforehand through small target trackers, better radio 
communications with eye witnesses and so on.266 
Because of the nature of this LIC, eliminating mother ships from the GOA would require a 
comparatively small strike force compared to that necessary for patrol. Thus, the current 
USN attempts at offensive action could remain the ‘tip of the spear’ in actively fighting 
pirates on the seas. Maintaining this capability is not only crucial for increasing the 
disincentivisation of piratical activities, but also in employing effective intelligence 
information to the optimal degree. 
International Law, however, would define the problem of attacking mother ships to be that 
of the coastal police or coast guard.267 If the Somali government, or TFG, possessed any 
modicum of authority, budget and incentive, these branches of law enforcement could 
theoretically be established. However, the TFG’s authority as state government is not 
particularly resolute within Somalia’s borders, which has dire impacts for any treaties of hot 
pursuit, prosecution and attack which signatory states such as the United States may have 
signed.  
This advocacy for offensive attacks against mother ships and skiffs is not a universally-held 
endorsement. James Kraska and Brian Wilson of the World Policy Institute argue that the 
post-capture judicial procedures are more important than the destruction of mother ships: 
“Coordination, not kinetic action aimed at destroying pirate mother ships and coastal havens, will 
solve the piracy problem. In other words, piracy will not fade until effective deterrents — namely 
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prosecution and punishment — are in place. And with Somalia unable to provide such deterrents, it 
falls to the international community to make progress in this area.”268 
What Kraska and Wilson overestimate, however, is the breadth of UNCLOS laws on piracy 
and the significance of prosecution as a deterrent to piracy. Given that Somali pirates by and 
large originate from the world’s most failed state, it is feasible to expect that threat of 
prosecution and imprisonment is preferable to a miserable existence on land in Somalia. 
More critically, the authors’ interpretation of UNCLOS’ definition on piracy conveniently 
omits the requirement that it occur on the high seas.269 Thus, any prosecution and 
punishment which they argue will solve the piracy problem cannot ever be enforced as 90% 
of piracy occurring in the GOA is not defined as such according to UNCLOS definition.270 Until 
International Law changes in conceptualisation to incorporation the problems of definition, 
as well as jurisd iction when multinational -crewed vessels are involved, Kraska and Wilson 
are advocating an extremely nebulous ‘solution’ based on a too-loose interpretation of 
International Law. 
The purpose of piracy repression in the GOA should not be aimed solely at the  lofty goal of 
deterring Somalis from an act which has precious few disadvantages, but rather incorporate 
the very possible practice of destroying mother ships as they exit ports of origin in Puntland.  
The ‘kinetic action’ employed against mother ships, when combined by good, collaborative 
intelligence gathering, can yield far more positive results for piracy repression than sheer 
deterrence through pirate conviction. If a mother ship can be identified, tracked and 
intercepted the moment it either attempts to deploy pirate skiffs or enters high 
seas/international waters, pirates will be deprived of their capability to roam far out to sea, 
thereby inhibiting the range of operations. Once properly identified and recorded as a pirate 
vessel, the legal complications in mistakenly attacking or boarding an innocent vessel are 
significantly reduced. Moreover, this would have the additional benefit of minimising the 
ocean space which requires naval patrols considerably as fewer mother ships operate in the 
GOA, there by aiding the entire counter-piracy process. 
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The final component of counter-piracy operations, that of targeting the pirate havens 
themselves, is a far more complex problem. While outright attack by combined forces would 
quite possibly yield significant civilian and hostage casualties, the capability is certainly held 
by the larger forces present in the GOA. But there are alternative measures which could be 
employed in conjunction with the above improvements to counter-piracy on the sea. 
Captain van Rooyen suggests the historical practice of blockading the ports, depriving the 
pirates’ ease of access and the general impunity from consequences which they have thus 
far enjoyed the moment they enter friendly waters.271 Blockades could well be acceptable in 
terms of International Law if negotiated through the TFG and UN, despite the TFG’s 
questionable grip on power. The major obstacle to this is the considerable length of time 
and number of warships required to blockade the several major ports which pirates employ, 
as well as the potential danger which they would face when stationed so close to hostile 
territory. But modern warships possess a significant range advantage over any weaponry 
which pirates have at their disposal, which would certai nly imply the feasibility of blockades. 
In conjunction with the above, employing financial tracking measures, or even heavy 
taxation, upon known money which enters neighbouring states which originates from pirate 
havens can be considered.272 Followin g the source of the money would also have the added 
benefit of aiding the intelligence process of identifying pirates and their leaders. 
In conjunction with an efficient patrol space by ‘defensive posture’ warships, such as CTF 
150, and the active and effective targeting of mother ships by more actively offensive states, 
all of whom would enjoy an optimal MDA due to increased intelligence cooperation, 
blockading ports would thus apply a level of pressure upon pirates such as may well provide 
not only the disincentivisation which is preferred by Kraska & Wilson, but literally deprive 
Somali pirates of their means of operations. Finally, all of the above would not directly 
violate or contradict International Law. 
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5.2 – Improving the Civilian Approach  
Commercial shipping sailing through the GOA can improve their odds at avoiding pirate 
attacks through both offensive and passive means. Offensively, the employment of PMC or 
PSC operators can have a measurably increase to a ships’ security, as the second attempted 
hijacking of the Alabama  clearly proves, but it is not an option which every shipping 
company can afford, as the costs involve, while hefty on an individual vessel, would be 
prohibitive if attempting to equip a fleet with armed guards. Legal issues aside, it can be 
considered an option, but a rather short-sighted one. Moreover, the risk of escalation can 
result in contrary effects in that, should a PMC or PSC fail to counter boarding, the risk of 
hostage deaths in retaliation can increase considerably. The use of acoustic devices and 
electrified fencing, combined with increased crew standing watch while sailing through the 
Gulf, and thorough counter-boarding training all have measured results. Non -lethal or 
passive measures are completely compliant with International Laws and are comparatively 
cheaper to employ than private contractors.273 But, as Cmdr. Upadhyaya  points out, many 
shipping companies remain heedless to IMO and IMB warnings, possibly as a result of the relatively 
low chance of pirate attack. 274 
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5.3 Conclusion 
There are profound challenges facing International Law, which in turn affects many 
components of counter-piracy operations in the GOA. The question of jurisdiction or just 
who is responsible for the prosecution of pirates, as well as who is willing to take the 
responsibility will remain a challenge in the post-capture process. The problem clearly 
distinguishing pirate vessels, skiffs and mother ships, from civilian shipping is as simple as 
finding a needle in a haystack. Gone are the days of pirates brazenly flying the Jolly Roger 
when embarking on a pirate attack. Instead, commanders are faced with the challenge of 
responding to pirate attacks before boarding occurs, following which either a lack of tactical 
capability in hostage rescue or political will prevents them from further action. VBSS 
procedures are not usually successful, as pirate skiffs resemble those of honest fishermen, 
and they waste precious time in deploying speedboats loaded with marines to board and 
search just one boat out of thousands. International Laws prevent more aggressive action, 
and for good reason, as the Tabar example highlights.275 
There would appear to be a causal relationship between International Law and the Strategic 
response thereof in the GOA. The definitional ambiguity of what a pirate is, how to track 
them, arrest or attack them, and how to prosecute all feed into state navies erring firmly on 
the side of caution except for the most clear-cut cases of interdiction or self-defence. With 
the bulk of warships patrolling the area in a simple deterrence measure, states can be seen 
to be ‘doing their bit’ to fight piracy, even though they really are not achieving any lasting 
containment. But International Law need not be a constraining factor. Indeed, by creating 
far more collaborative intelligence networks through a high command structure or some 
other fashion, as well as other non-controversial, safe measures, fighting piracy can be 
improved considerably. As the UN Secretary-General rightfully mentioned, piracy is not a 
‘water-borne disease’, and any attempts to fight it on the ocean must be matched with a 
concerted effort on land, but there does still remain sufficient strategic potential to 
minimise piracy-effects on the international shipping lane considerably.276 When it come s to 
countering piracy in the GOA, improving intelligence networks, and heightening MDA is a 
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good step forward while still complying with a frustratingly inefficient set of International 
Laws on piracy. 
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